I believe you’re right MsBetsy. However, there’s some interesting terminology and I think the DT used the wrong term in this case. We shall see.
@gitana1 help me out here!!
Google is my friend, so I googled “lingering doubt.” There’s a lot of legalese in these two quoted paragraphs, but it appears that there is a difference between “residual doubt” and “lingering doubt” even though some use the terms interchangeably. I’m still trying to make sense of it, but I’ll post it in case our resident attorney shows up. Here goes:
Although the term “lingering doubt” is at times used synonymously with “residual doubt,” see Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 187 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring) and State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 45 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1010 (1996),
the two terms must be distinguished to take into account the differing ways in which a jury may experience doubts about the propriety of imposing a death sentence. “Lingering” or “remaining” doubt applies to the level of uncertainty that a juror may have as he engages in the weighing process and
attempts to discern what mitigation exists and how much weight it should be accorded. Thus,
lingering doubt bespeaks of uncertainty in the quantum of mitigation, or how such mitigation weighs against the aggravating factors. See, e.g., Kennan v. California, 480 U.S. 1012 (1989) (juror should have not been bullied and threatened into foregoing any “lingering doubts” about the “appropriateness of imposing the death penalty”) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Rockwell, 161 Ariz. at 16 (“The significant mitigating evidence this case presents balanced against a single aggravating factor causes us to question whether a death sentence is warranted here. That being the case, we will continue to adhere to the principle
that, "[w]here there is a doubt whether the death penalty should be imposed, we will resolve that doubt in favor of a life sentence." ); State v. Valencia, 132 Ariz. 248, 250-51 (1982) (where there is “doubt” about how much weight to give defendant’s youthful age of 16 when compared to the severity of the crime, the court will “resolve that doubt in favor of a life sentence”).
[2]
In contrast, “residual” doubt addresses the level of uncertainty that a juror may have that the defendant is actually the guilty party. As noted by Justice O’Connor, far from being a “fact about the defendant or the circumstances of the crime,”
residual doubt is “lingering uncertainty about facts, a state of mind that exists somewhere between ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ and ‘absolute certainty.’” Franklin, 487 U.S. at 187-88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
In this context, residual doubt serves as a heightened burden of proof, requiring the imposition of the death sentence only upon proof beyond all doubt. See Id. at 188 (“
Nothing in our cases mandates the imposition of this heightened burden of proof at capital sentencing”); accord State v. Harrod (“I”), 200 Ariz. 309, 317, n.7 (2001), judgment vacate and remanded on other grounds at 536 U.S. 953 (2002)
(“residual doubt” is equated with an “absolute certainty” standard that “may be a more appropriate standard for the imposition of the death penalty”).
RESIDUAL DOUBT/INNOCENCE
Sooooo...what I’m getting from this is that the DT is actually talking about “residual doubt,” since they say that he shouldn’t have been convicted, and that the death penalty should only be imposed if the jury has absolute certainty that CM is guilty. “Lingering doubt” has to do with mitigating circumstances that might make LWOP more appropriate. But it doesn’t surprise me that the DT has seemingly, from my totally amateur perspective, used the term “lingering doubt” in the wrong way.
Did I come close
@gitana1?
