I'm just copying over a few of the relevant law notes in relation to the appeal in the case of Crown vs Stone and Dobinson, (manslaughter conviction) because a/ it's difficult to read at the website with that green stripe across the page and b/ I think it's relevant to the same standards and judge's directions that will apply to this case.
The judge's direction that,
if the appellants did not appreciate that their neglect " would lead to any dire results" they should be acquitted, cannot be criticised. The judge also gave a full and proper direction that the jury should consider the case by subjective standards.
The appellant Dobinson was worried and told Emily West that Fanny would not wash, go to the toilet or eat or drink. As a result Emily West immediately advised Dobinson to get a doctor and when told that Fanny's doctor lived at Doncaster, Emily West suggested getting a local one. It seems that some efforts were made to get a local doctor, but the neighbour who volunteered to do the telephoning (the appellants being incapable of managing the instrument themselves) was unsuccessful.
The appellant Stone was interviewed subsequently. He was asked, "Did Gwen tell you that Fanny was in a bad way? " He replied, "Yes, but Fanny was very stubborn and would not let anyone do for her.
"I remember Gwen and Mrs. Wilson going up to see her. They said she was in a baddish way. I said, 'We must do something.' I do not remember whether there was any attempt to get a doctor after that. I did not think she was dying.
This was not a situation analogous to the drowning stranger. They did make efforts to care. They tried to get a doctor; they tried to discover the previous doctor. The appellant Dobinson helped with the washing and the provision of food. All these matters were put before the jury in terms which we find it impossible to fault. The jury were entitled to find that the duty had been assumed. They were entitled to conclude that once Fanny became helplessly infirm, as she had by July 19, the appellants were, in the circumstances, obliged either to summon help or else to care for Fanny themselves.
This is how the matter was left to the jury:
"Have the Crown proved that either or both of these defendants was guilty of gross neglect of Fanny amounting to a reckless disregard for the health and well-being of that woman. Do not place your judgment on the question of recklessness as to whether she died or not. What has to be proved is not that, but that there was a reckless disregard for their duty of care. It may well be that that will involve a consideration of what they thought would be the consequences of their reckless disregard if you found there was one. For example, if I were in charge of a person and I was guilty of some major neglect, but I genuinely did not appreciate that it would lead to any dire results, you would probably say, 'That person is not very bright, but I am not sure he is guilty of recklessness!' "
Then, at a later stage in the direction:
"… were either or both of these defendants in grave neglect of that duty, were they reckless or did they show a reckless disregard for their obligations. Again it depends to a large extent on the extent of their knowledge of her condition; of their individual appreciation of the need to act. It depends to some extent on their appreciation of the consequences of the consequences of inaction; it depends on the facilities which were available or which they could readily have made available.
Mr. Stone says 'nothing was done because I was not aware of the gravity of the matter of the danger to Fanny's life and of the situation. I did not know the actual conditions in which my sister was lying.' If that is true or if it may be true then you will acquit him. If you are sure that he did know then you ask yourselves: what did he do about it, and what could he have done ...
You do not judge him, on what you would have done yourselves; but you take the man as you find him … So far as Mrs. Dobinson is concerned ... did she do her incompetent best? Certainly if she did that, then you would acquit her."
What the prosecution have to prove is a breach of that duty in such circumstances that the jury feel convinced that the defendant's conduct can properly be described as reckless, that is to say a reckless disregard of danger to the health and welfare of the infirm person. Mere inadvertence is not enough. The defendant must be proved to have been
indifferent to an obvious risk of injury to health, or actually to have foreseen the risk but to have determined nevertheless to run it.
R v Stone & Dobinson
