MO - Duck boat carrying 31 tourists capsizes, killing 17, near Branson, July 2018

What are the possible legal ramifications of this horrendous tragedy? I imagine there are going to be numerous civil lawsuits.

I don’t know how effective lifejackets would be with the canopy on and the vehicle filling up with water it would still have been difficult getting out but possibly more people may have survived. I have never seen one of these duck boats in person.
 
Just a thought. Why has the NTSB let 15-20 years go by after first warning changes that needed to be made for duck boats?

It appears the NTSB does not follow up on their warnings or investigate these duck boats very often. This is a crime IMO that goes back to the inefficiency of this safety board.
 
Sheriff releases names of victims killed in Table Rock Lake tragedy

tablerocklake_1532128305499_12489597_ver1.0_640_360.PNG


Sheriff releases names of victims in Table Rock Lake tragedy
 
Just a thought. Why has the NTSB let 15-20 years go by after first warning changes that needed to be made for duck boats?

It appears the NTSB does not follow up on their warnings or investigate these duck boats very often. This is a crime IMO that goes back to the inefficiency of this safety board.

NTSB on Table Rock Tragedy: Cause of Boat Capsizing Could Take One Year to Determine

Not to get off into politics, but there are so many government agencies that have had budgets whacked to where inspections don't take place at all or if they do it is after an incident. FDA is another example. When our politicians brag about all the government "regulations" they have gotten rid of, they don't necessarily say which ones. In this case the NTSB has now taken over the investigation. I am sure one of their findings will NOT be "we should have been here sooner"

JMO

NTSB on Table Rock Tragedy: Cause of Boat Capsizing Could Take One Year to Determine
 
BRANSON, Mo. (KY3/AP) — Stone County Sheriff Doug Rader confirms 17 died in a Ride the Ducks sinking. The sheriff now says all 31 on board the duck is accounted for in the tragedy.

Authorities blamed stormy weather for the accident Thursday evening on Table Rock Lake. Winds at the time were blowing as hard as 65 mph, according to the National Weather Service.

Stone County Sheriff: 17 dead, 14 survivors in deadly Ride the Ducks sinking

bridges are locked down and emergency responders cease to operate at winds of 45 in hurricanes --
 
ABC News is reporting that the National Weather Service issued a severe thunderstorm warning with high winds for that area about half an hour before the boat was hit. Incredible negligence to take those boats on the water. A warning means the storm had formed and was on its way.

People said it was sunny and the storm popped up out of nowhere, but clearly the National Weather Service was all over it in plenty of time. Weather forecasting is too good these days for these operators to not be aware of imminent weather threats. My cell phone goes off automatically with watches and warnings because I want to be aware of severe threats since we live in the midwest. Any company with outdoor operations is obligated to keep on top of the weather!


How the Missouri duck boat capsize unfolded amid weather warnings

I am not sure I agree Here the forecasts are often widely overblown and a form of desensitization occurs
 
The warnings were long before they would've gone put on the water:

"WSB-Atlanta Meteorologist Brian Monahan tweeted,

This severe weather threat was forecast for DAYS.

Monahan is correct. I went back to find the National Weather Service Storm Prediction Center convective outlooks issued on July 18th, a day or so before the event. The discussion said,

The potential for one or more early day thunderstorm clusters complicates the forecast scenario on Thursday. Any such cluster may present a localized severe wind risk early in the day, especially across portions of MO … Further south down the Mississippi Valley, a more conditional severe risk will be present. Any early day thunderstorm cluster that survives may rejuvenate across portions of southern MO/northern AR during the afternoon. Later-day storms that initiate further north may also merge into a cluster that moves southeastward into this region. Some damaging wind risk would be possible in either scenario, with some marginal hail risk associated with any more discrete convection that may develop."

The boat operators knew of the forecast days before.

Frankly, I think they typically ignore such warnings if it looks clear enough because a storm this bad is probably rare and they don't want to lose money by being cautious when most of the time nothing bad happens.

But there should be a moral obligation to never place profit over lives.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.fo...ecause-storm-did-not-come-out-of-nowhere/amp/



I think life jackets might have actually made it harder for some people to survive in that situation.

It looks like the sides were enclosed with some sort of clear, vinyl panels due to the weather. As the boat capsized, which took seconds and which they were unlikely to truly believe would happen, the passengers would all have been flipped sideways into each other, as belongings and anything else not secured whipped around them, and as water immediately rushed in, submerging them in seconds.

They would've been mostly trapped in an upside down vessel with the weight of thousands of pounds of water pressing the boat and them downward, with bodies pinned to the ceiling of the vessel, as it sank.

Those wearing a life jackets would be more securely pinned to the upside down ceiling by the competing forces of the floatation device's bouancy and the pressure of the water.

Life jackets would also make it harder to swim sideways away from the ceiling and put a window, if they could undo a panel.

Imagine trying to do all of this in fast, heavy, rushing water, as people and objects fling around, while trying to gather your kids.

I imagine many of those who escaped weren't wearing life jackets and were somehow able to get out a window panel as the boat was capsizing, before it went under.

This is horrific.

Were under warnings constantly - they tend not to register
 
But they have a responsibility to watch the forecast and know long before they go out. They don't need a severe weather warning. Just read the forecast which stated a line of t-cells was coming.

Boats that unwieldy and unseaworthy should never be out on water when any storm of any kind is forecast- severe or not, at least in my uneducated opinion on water craft!


These are tanks with wheels and an outboard! I think we kind of get the notion that they should not be out unless there is pretty clear weather might be wrong

There are many variables -- it is like each aircraft tragedy -- rarely is it one thing

ie

one gust at certain angle based on the angle of the vcsel at the split second in time resulted in a specific amount of water being taken on dooming the vessel

on operator input that was over or under kill could set the stage for the vessel not to be able to respond or react correctly

one high wave and propulsion pattern was thrown out of whack resulting in setting up a chain reaction of events that were undoable

weight of passengers a variable - where they were sitting as it relates to center of gravity and handling characteristics of the vessel on that particular run

angle of the gusts as it interacts with the canopy

temporary loss of engine power

these things are kind of like a sympathy with one thing off the end performance changes

NTSB will find all this out - but it usually is a cluster of one time events in a milliseconds -- I would think as an operation these things operate in some rain so shuddering operations everytime the weather service screams about something isnt practical

we also have to IMO remain cognizant that those weather entities job is to put out warnings

especially nodays with the internet they really are endless cry wolf - even for hurricanes our current technology is very far from perfect

if we look back at 2004-05 hurricane season they evacuated millions upon millions repeatedly and endlessly and needlessly over and over and over again

sitting somewhere dry and all it is easy to say for a "life" it is worth it

there are enormous roadblocks to evacuating - and in most instances it is useless in that there is really no where to go in many of the hurricane evacuations more people were killed - and there was certainly massive human suffering being trapped in carbon monoxide parade going nowhere - than the actual storm.

honestly imo tornado stuff is really the only weather entity warning system that has real life saving possibilities

and tsunamis....

this was an accident man vs nature nature always wins

the old adage to error is human is well ...fact....

as a society we are relentless in quick to go into blame mode

ac·ci·dent:

an unfortunate incident that happens unexpectedly and unintentionally, typically resulting in damage or injury.

an event that happens by chance or that is without apparent or deliberate cause.

cake cookies super rare roast beef hugs would be the response 80 years ago now it is consultations with attorneys ....

imo that is as tragic as the tragedies and losses themselves in some instances

jmo



moo
 
I don't think a partial refund would work. One of the points of riding "the ducks" is to be on the water, to get a combination bus tour and boat ride. I think you'd have people cancelling. If I'm going to take just a bus tour, I'd do it in a nice bus with comfy seats and AC.

limo... with a bar.....and a handsome driver!

 
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If anyone still has any doubts about whether this tragedy was preventable, please read this article from the Washington Post that Chicago TV meteorologist Tom Skilling posted on his FB page. It is excellent, and points to all the warning advice and time given ahead of the storm, from the mouths of the meteorologists themselves:

Analysis | The violent storm behind the duck boat tragedy was well-predicted, not ‘out of nowhere’

Because the line of storms was made of different cells each collapsing independently, their combined outflow boundary became a bit wonky. Over Table Rock Lake, the boundary formed a kink where two segments of it merged. That probably enhanced wind speed near their intersection and created an area perhaps three miles wide of brief ground-level rotating winds. While this is very different from a tornado, it spawned another wind shift that angered the waves even more.
 
This tragedy has received much coverage here in Indianapolis, where nine members of one family died.

This morning they were discussing life jackets, because one of the survivors said that she has asked about putting life jackets on and was told it wasn’t necessary.

I know life jackets don’t always save lives, as in the case where people are trapped under or inside a watercraft and can’t get out. But in general, your chances of survival are greater when you are wearing a life jacket.

I am a member of a watercraft organization, and at club events everyone is required to wear a life jacket, and we are all very experienced boaters and excellent swimmers. No exceptions: forget your life jacket and you don’t participate.

How much more important for tourists, with children, be required to wear life jackets! Some of the passengers might not be able to swim, and it could have even been their first time on a boat.

Last month I went on a couple of whale watching tours in California, operated by local tour companies. One tour had approximately 60 passengers, around half were children, including babies and toddlers. No life jackets were provided, and when I inquired I was told they were required to have life jackets on board in case of emergency.

The operator told me that that the life jackets were stored under the bench seats. If the boat had capsized, would everyone be able to find and put on a life jacket? Did most of the passengers even know how to put on a life jacket properly? What about the parents who had more than one child? Would they be able to locate their children and get them into life jackets in a panicky situation? Were there the proper number of chikdren’s life jackets available?

I am a trained water rescuer, and have been involved with several water rescues. I can tell you that people panic and even adults aren’t able to find and put on their own life jacket at times.

I have friends who own boats of different types, and they always insist on fitting life jackets properly to each guest they take on board. The proper size of jackets for each adult and child.

Sorry for the rambling post, just putting down some of my thoughts.
 
Just a thought. Why has the NTSB let 15-20 years go by after first warning changes that needed to be made for duck boats?

It appears the NTSB does not follow up on their warnings or investigate these duck boats very often. This is a crime IMO that goes back to the inefficiency of this safety board.

The NTSB is an investigative entity - it has no enforcement capabilities. It gives safety reccs to specific agencies in each domain (air train transportation pipeline highway accidents etc ) who then like every other part of our govt do nothing for decades.

After they get the reccs from the NTSB they have meetings and committees to meet on the meetings of the committees to decide that a meeting regarding a committee must be formed to review the committee findings.

Our commercial aviation mind boggling safety records are solely a result of the NTSB relentless pursuit of safety in all domains for decades

Everything comes back to money - period.

In most instances you will find NTSB has predicted warned written specifics on what needs to be done and ignored by regulators.

It all goes by tombstone regulation. Like an example -- (not doing specifics just to give an idea )the g forces airplane seats can tolerate before buckling.

It goes like we have a 1 percent chance of leg buckling in 4 percent of controlled flight into terrain accidents which directly relate to 425 people being killed over a decade.

Agencies that are supposed to do something about anything then calculate that each homosapien would cost approximately about 1 million bucks per death directly caused by leg failure in accident.

The regulatory agency then spends about 19 million bucks to determine that it would cost about 1.2 billion to implement what the safety board says is needed to increase the g load requirements.

Our fearless leaders and those in power do the math and it is a big savings to only lose 425 humans and 425 bucks compared to spending 1.2 billion needed to do the right thing and implement the recommendation that NTSB made.

This nonsense can be speeded up by a decade or so if there is a high profile big loss of life with lots and lots of juicy media coverage. The first example that comes to mind is Positive Control on trains - which the NTSB has been screaming about for decades.

Amtrack trains began crashing into each other as NTSB warned would be happening decades ago. Finally legislation was drafted based on NTSB work .

Congress gave them a deadline to have NTSB recc done by a certain date. Train operators ignored it basically. And then a cluster of trains started crashing into each other again. This resulted in congress finally having to remind operators that they ordered them to install it on their equipment years ago and they blew it off

So now as a result of people getting killed over and over now train operators have another couple of years of do it. Some are starting some are saying they have no money for it .

It then goes back to it is cheaper to get fined for not doing it than it is to it.
All money

saying warmly don't ever criticize my beloved NTSB!! They are the only govt entity I know of that fulfills there mandate with integrity passion and rigor!

THey are incredible -- if one has never read one of their investigations one should . THey are incredible reads.

A tiny tiny example


Marine Accident Brief: Capsizing and Sinking of Fishing Vessel Destination 2/11/2017 7/20/2018 St. George Island
AK USA Bering Sea, 56°39’ N, 169°49.8’ W PDF
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PAB1801 Pipeline Accident Brief: TransCanada Corporation Pipeline (Keystone Pipeline) Rupture 11/16/2017 7/5/2018 Amherst
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Preliminary Report: HWY18FH012 Preliminary Report: Highway HWY18FH012 4/12/2018 6/28/2018 Dumfries
VA USA Prince William County PDF
MAB1816 Marine Accident Brief: Fire aboard Sailing Vessel Best Revenge 5 7/11/2017 6/28/2018 Falmouth
MA USA Falmouth Inner Harbor, 41°32.80’ N, 70°36.19’ W PDF
HWY18FH013-prelim Preliminary Report: Highway HWY18FH013 5/8/2018 6/26/2018 Fort Lauderdale
FL USA PDF
MAB1815 Marine Accident Brief: Grounding and Sinking of Towing Vessel Eric Haney 7/8/2017 6/21/2018 Cairo
IL USA Upper Mississippi River, 37°05.479’ N, 89°16.263’ W PDF
PSR1801 Safety Recommendation Report: Installation of PermaLock Mechanical Tapping Tee Assemblies


Accident Reports
 
Here is their final on Duck boat accident in 2010.

Table of Contents of this report:

Factual Information.......................................................................................................................1 Accident Narrative ...........................................................................................................................1 Emergency Response .......................................................................................................................9 Injuries ...........................................................................................................................................10 Damage ..........................................................................................................................................10 DUKW 34................................................................................................................................10 Caribbean Sea/The Resource .................................................................................................12 Operations Information and Events Preceding the Accident.........................................................12 Ride The Ducks and DUKW 34..............................................................................................12 K-Sea Transportation and the Caribbean Sea ........................................................................15 Family Medical Emergency of the Caribbean Sea Mate .......................................................17 Mate‘s Cell Phone Use ...........................................................................................................17 Mate‘s Use of Company Laptop Computer............................................................................18 Survival Factors.............................................................................................................................18 Safety Briefing........................................................................................................................18 Lifesaving Equipment.............................................................................................................21 Evacuation ..............................................................................................................................22 Vessel Information.........................................................................................................................23 DUKW 34................................................................................................................................23 Caribbean Sea ........................................................................................................................25 The Resource ..........................................................................................................................26 Personnel Information....................................................................................................................26 DUKW 34 Master ...................................................................................................................26 DUKW 34 Deckhand ..............................................................................................................28 Caribbean Sea Master ............................................................................................................28 Caribbean Sea Mate ...............................................................................................................29 Medical and Toxicological Information ........................................................................................30 Caribbean Sea Crewmembers................................................................................................30 DUKW 34 Crewmembers.......................................................................................................31 Meteorological Information...........................................................................................................31 Waterway Information...................................................................................................................31 Postaccident Inspection and Testing..............................................................................................32 DUKW 34................................................................................................................................32 Caribbean Sea ........................................................................................................................36 NTSB Marine Accident Report iv Maintenance of Ride The Ducks Philadelphia APVs....................................................................37 General....................................................................................................................................37 Daily Vehicle Inspections—General ......................................................................................38 Daily Inspections of DUKW 34 ..............................................................................................39 Recent Maintenance on DUKW 34.........................................................................................39 Coast Guard Notifications and Ride The Ducks Emergency Procedures........................................40 Company Policies Regarding Use of Wireless Devices While on Duty .......................................42 K-Sea Transportation..............................................................................................................42 Ride The Ducks ......................................................................................................................43 Visibility Study ..............................................................................................................................43 Coast Guard Oversight of Ride The Ducks Operations.................................................................44 Initiation of Operations...........................................................................................................44 Inspection History of DUKW 34.............................................................................................45 Safety Management at K-Sea Transportation and Ride The Ducks..............................................46 General....................................................................................................................................46 K-Sea Transportation and the Caribbean Sea ........................................................................47 Ride The Ducks ......................................................................................................................48 Other Information ..........................................................................................................................49 Postaccident Actions—Ride The Ducks.................................................................................49 Postaccident Actions—K-Sea Transportation ........................................................................52 Analysis.........................................................................................................................................54 Fire Emergency on Board DUKW 34 ............................................................................................55 Performance of Ride the Ducks Maintenance Personnel...............................................................56 Performance of the Operating Crews Before the Accident ...........................................................57 Location of Mate While Navigating the Caribbean Sea ........................................................57 Lack of Attention to Duty by the Caribbean Sea Mate..........................................................59 Personal Use of Cell Phone and Laptop Computer by the Caribbean Sea Mate ........................60 Performance of the Caribbean Sea Master.............................................................................62 Performance of the DUKW 34 Master and Deckhand............................................................63 Personal Cell Phone Use by the DUKW 34 Deckhand...........................................................64 Nonoperational Use of Cell Phones and Other Wireless Devices.................................................64 Survival Factors.............................................................................................................................66 Emergency Response..............................................................................................................66 Safety Briefing........................................................................................................................67 Safety Management Systems and Corporate Safety Culture .........................................................68 K-Sea Transportation..............................................................................................................68 Ride The Ducks ......................................................................................................................69 Conclusions...................................................................................................................................71 Findings ..................................

They read like true crime books -- with the mystery solved by the end of the first half.

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAR1102.pdf

They are like the supreme court -- if a member of the board does not agree with the conclusions on causation they can write and have a dissent inserted into the final report.

They hold public court hearings and conduct trials.
 
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Realistically living in MO we outrun most storms, otherwise we would only be able to go out and do things half of the time. When the forecasters say storm watch we don't just sit around watching. This storm from the other day was forewarned for sure, but when they switch over to storm warning is when we really start watching.

JMO
 
This interview confused me.....did this women's children all die? :(

It looks like she lost her husband and three children. I'd think she's still in shock. bbm

Coleman Douglas said the victims included her uncles Horace "Butch" Coleman and Irving Raymond Coleman; Horace Coleman's wife, Belinda Coleman; her cousins, Angela Coleman and Glenn Coleman; Angela's 2-year-old son Maxwell; Glenn's two sons Evan and Reece; and his 1-year-old daughter, Arya.


Glenn's wife, Tia Coleman, and Angela's older son, whose name has not been released, survived the accident, Coleman Douglas said.

ETA Link

Duck boat tragedy: These are the nine Indianapolis family members who died
 
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