Found Deceased CO - Suzanne Morphew, 49, Chaffee County, 10 May 2020 #62 *ARREST*

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Small correction but an important one. Respectfully done by me to keep the only details we know accurate:

The text exchange was Friday the 8th NOT Saturday the 9th.

Also in the video shared above, (thank you) Lauren admits she received threats during investigating. 1:00:40. That's a new detail.
Well, it did seem that threats were was the rwson LS did not attend the Park Memorial with Andy.
 
TD's Recording w BM?
How would that work for the TD recording when BM asked him to put away the recording device?
@TIGER0822
1. Is TD's recording admissible as evd in BM's crim trial? Imo likely.
But before it is admitted and shown to jury, atty must "lay the foundation" by
calling TD to the witness stand to testify under oath to authenticate audio-video recording, as being a true and accurate representation of their conversation & actions shown that day & place, that the vid has not been edited (& other tedious details omitted from courtroom scenes in Law & Order episodes;)) etc. In pre-trial hearings, atty's may argue about admissibility of some parts & the purposes for which the vid is offered, etc. Likely admitted imo.

2. I'm reading ^ post as asking if def atty objects to admission of recording -
---- on grounds BM did not consent to being recorded, how a judge would rule? Per info below* BM’s non-consent to being recorded does not present an issue as to admissibility, so imo, objection overruled.
---- on grounds, after BM asked/told TD to stop recording, that TD lied by saying he stopped but instead continued recording, how a judge would rule? TD’s lie on the recording does not preclude the recording from being admitted as evidence of BM’s stmts on the recording. Imo, objection overruled.

3. TD’s Stmt on Vid
I recall reading differences of opinion about exactly what BM & TD said & did, but tbh I cannot say I recall/heard all their stmts accurately.
If, if, if TD told BM, he stopped recording but continued - IOW TD lied - def atty can use TD’s lie then, to attack TD's credibility now/at trial, imo.

Welcoming comment, clarification, correction, esp’ly from legal professionals. my2ct.
____________________________________
* CO law, info on recording convo's, from private law firm websites.
"Is recording in-person conversations legal in Colorado?
“People in Colorado may secretly record their in-person conversations in Colorado. They can take audio or video recordings of a conversation they have with someone else, whether in private or a public place."
^ Does Colorado Have A One Party Consent Statute?
Some posters referenced CO 'one-party' statute as permitting recording a convo, but respectfully iiuc, that concerns "telephone conversations" and "electronic communications."
See Secretly Tape Recording Conversations in Colorado | Denver Criminal Lawyer and CO. R. S. 18-9-303. Wiretapping prohibited – penalty

Per above, TD recording his in-person convo w BM was not criminal. Likewise if TD had talked w BM in a telephone conversation & made a recording, that would not have been a criminal act.
Also, even if a person making an audio-video recording had done so unlawfully, I don't know that such a recording would be inadmissible in a crim trial for purposes of proving stmts made by one of the parties in the convo.
 
The daughters can, and likely have hired an atty to handle the AA...i.e read, process and vett it....to provide them with what they need to know....pertinance info. That filter would be very beneficial to them.
I wonder if the defense team is working with them as well. They may be asked by the defense to testify for their father, saying how happily married their parents were and what a great father he is.

This is going to be a very traumatic experience for these young ladies.
 
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He has 2 sisters.
Thank you. Being the only son he probably felt it was expected for him to be successful. I'm sure for a long time he considered Suzanne one of his successes? His flings were just ego boosts and he had no intention of leaving her until the money ran out.
 
TD's Recording w BM?
@TIGER0822
1. Is TD's recording admissible as evd in BM's crim trial? Imo likely.
But before it is admitted and shown to jury, atty must "lay the foundation" by
calling TD to the witness stand to testify under oath to authenticate audio-video recording, as being a true and accurate representation of their conversation & actions shown that day & place, that the vid has not been edited (& other tedious details omitted from courtroom scenes in Law & Order episodes;)) etc. In pre-trial hearings, atty's may argue about admissibility of some parts & the purposes for which the vid is offered, etc. Likely admitted imo.

2. I'm reading ^ post as asking if def atty objects to admission of recording -
---- on grounds BM did not consent to being recorded, how a judge would rule? Per info below* BM’s non-consent to being recorded does not present an issue as to admissibility, so imo, objection overruled.
---- on grounds, after BM asked/told TD to stop recording, that TD lied by saying he stopped but instead continued recording, how a judge would rule? TD’s lie on the recording does not preclude the recording from being admitted as evidence of BM’s stmts on the recording. Imo, objection overruled.

3. TD’s Stmt on Vid
I recall reading differences of opinion about exactly what BM & TD said & did, but tbh I cannot say I recall/heard all their stmts accurately.
If, if, if TD told BM, he stopped recording but continued - IOW TD lied - def atty can use TD’s lie then, to attack TD's credibility now/at trial, imo.

Welcoming comment, clarification, correction, esp’ly from legal professionals. my2ct.
____________________________________
* CO law, info on recording convo's, from private law firm websites.
"Is recording in-person conversations legal in Colorado?
“People in Colorado may secretly record their in-person conversations in Colorado. They can take audio or video recordings of a conversation they have with someone else, whether in private or a public place."
^ Does Colorado Have A One Party Consent Statute?
Some posters referenced CO 'one-party' statute as permitting recording a convo, but respectfully iiuc, that concerns "telephone conversations" and "electronic communications."
See Secretly Tape Recording Conversations in Colorado | Denver Criminal Lawyer and CO. R. S. 18-9-303. Wiretapping prohibited – penalty

Per above, TD recording his in-person convo w BM was not criminal. Likewise if TD had talked w BM in a telephone conversation & made a recording, that would not have been a criminal act.
Also, even if a person making an audio-video recording had done so unlawfully, I don't know that such a recording would be inadmissible in a crim trial for purposes of proving stmts made by one of the parties in the convo.
My thought is they would not allow the edited version? It would have to be the raw original but I'm not sure what happens in these types of circumstances where someone shot video, edited and broadcast an edited version which is what people saw.
 
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I am in no way trying to be argumentative. If I have this wrong, please point me to the transcript to which you are referring. The transcript I posted said Friday the 8th and she deleted the text, but before doing so immediately text back. I didn't see anything with the exception of her terrible intuitive feeling on Saturday. Posted below again.

and i decided i would delete that text
83:17
and but
83:18
before i did i had texted her
83:20
immediately back
83:21
and i had said to her i need to pray
83:23
about this because i want to respond
83:25
correctly
I just wanted to say thank you so much to you both, @EggSalad and @TKG for your time diving into the confusing details here and sharing with the rest of us. You both are much appreciated!
 
Ultimately, @10ofRods is right that the defense will be pressing to exclude evidence referred to in the AA. In fact, the judge's decision strongly suggests they have already raised issues of relevance and admissibility with which the judge is inclined to agree. We don't know all the issues that have been raised, but we know the motions to suppress and limit evidence are coming.

I doubt the CCSO lied to BM. I't just hard to imagine a scenario where it would be seen as helpful. And Miranda warnings only apply to statements made after a suspect is in custody - BM made no statements we know of after his arrest.

But as @NinjaBunny points out, it's police misconduct - coercing a confession out of a suspect in custody - that leads to an exclusion order, and not every act of "strategic deception" by police is treated by the courts as coercive. In the famous case of Frazier v. Cupp the police told the suspect falsely that his co-defendant had confessed and implicated him. The Supreme Court, looking at the totality of the circumstances, did not find Frazier's subsequent confession to be involuntary under the Constitutional standard.

There have been other cases since, where police deceived a suspect into confessions or other "statements against interest," which are otherwise admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule [CRE 804(b)(3)], and where the Supreme Court declined to exclude them from evidence. Police have crossed the line when they induced a confession by making a false promise of leniency, or when they told a suspect what he says won't be admissible in evidence. But @10ofRods is right to say the line isn't clear, and the issue is commonly raised on appeal. Here's an article I found that will give you a sense of the issues that seem to constrain the courts in developing a clearer line - Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?

The Brits have banned lying as an interrogation technique. I looked for some indication that Colorado has taken a similar stance, but found none. At least one Colorado practitioner says there is no bright line rule.

My personal opinion is that the voluntariness of BM's statements to investigators will not be a big issue in this case. The focus of the arguments will be statements to others that are too remote in time to prove or disprove a fact in the case, statements by SM that are arguably not exceptions to the hearsay rule, and statements that arguably paint a negative picture of BM's character without making murder after deliberation more likely.
 
Ultimately, @10ofRods is right that the defense will be pressing to exclude evidence referred to in the AA. In fact, the judge's decision strongly suggests they have already raised issues of relevance and admissibility with which the judge is inclined to agree. We don't know all the issues that have been raised, but we know the motions to suppress and limit evidence are coming.

I doubt the CCSO lied to BM. I't just hard to imagine a scenario where it would be seen as helpful. And Miranda warnings only apply to statements made after a suspect is in custody - BM made no statements we know of after his arrest.

But as @NinjaBunny points out, it's police misconduct - coercing a confession out of a suspect in custody - that leads to an exclusion order, and not every act of "strategic deception" by police is treated by the courts as coercive. In the famous case of Frazier v. Cupp the police told the suspect falsely that his co-defendant had confessed and implicated him. The Supreme Court, looking at the totality of the circumstances, did not find Frazier's subsequent confession to be involuntary under the Constitutional standard.

There have been other cases since, where police deceived a suspect into confessions or other "statements against interest," which are otherwise admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule [CRE 804(b)(3)], and where the Supreme Court declined to exclude them from evidence. Police have crossed the line when they induced a confession by making a false promise of leniency, or when they told a suspect what he says won't be admissible in evidence. But @10ofRods is right to say the line isn't clear, and the issue is commonly raised on appeal. Here's an article I found that will give you a sense of the issues that seem to constrain the courts in developing a clearer line - Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?

The Brits have banned lying as an interrogation technique. I looked for some indication that Colorado has taken a similar stance, but found none. At least one Colorado practitioner says there is no bright line rule.

My personal opinion is that the voluntariness of BM's statements to investigators will not be a big issue in this case. The focus of the arguments will be statements to others that are too remote in time to prove or disprove a fact in the case, statements by SM that are arguably not exceptions to the hearsay rule, and statements that arguably paint a negative picture of BM's character without making murder after deliberation more likely.
I think the only reason Barry said the FBI can "lie" was to dispute what Andy said the FBI told him. He probably didn't want everyone to know he had refused a polygraph twice. He didn't like that Andy said he had not been cooperating at all, and that the house smelled like bleach, that police thought it was odd that there were no coolers in the house, etc. He may have already told his family and friends conflicting stories.

The only problem is, Andy was not the suspect. Barry was. So his response that the FBI can lie doesn't quite fit with the circumstances.

I don't think it's any indication that Barry was lied to or coerced, so it probably won't be an issue if the case goes to trial.

IMO
 
Has any direct social or alumni link been established between the defense attorney and the judge? If there is, I would think the prosecution would be asking the judge to recuse himself due to conflict of interest. In PA, if the judge refuses to recuse him/her self, the president judge would determine if there is conflict and reassign to a different judge. I'm not sure how CO handles this.
 
Has any direct social or alumni link been established between the defense attorney and the judge? If there is, I would think the prosecution would be asking the judge to recuse himself due to conflict of interest. In PA, if the judge refuses to recuse him/her self, the president judge would determine if there is conflict and reassign to a different judge. I'm not sure how CO handles this.
As you might suspect, there's a rule for that :) - pasted below. Generally, judges are expected to remove themselves (not wait for the prosecution or defense to raise the issue) if there is any reason grounded in fact to believe they may not be impartial. Appearances matter, but it takes more than a social relationship or a shared alma mater to raise a serious concern, and I doubt the parties will ask Judge Murphy to disqualify himself. In a small town like Salida, it's far more likely that a judge who's been working there for over 20 years knows personally many more local prosectors than out of town lawyers.

Judge Murphy is not only highly respected as the Chief Judge, he is by far the best qualified in criminal law and procedure in the 11th District. Both sides will want him to oversee this case if it stays in Chaffee County IMO.

Colo. Code. Jud. Cond. 2.11
As amended through Rule Change 2021(6), effective May 3, 2021

Rule 2.11 - Disqualification

(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality* might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:

(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge* of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.

(2) The judge knows* that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner,* or a person within the third degree of relationship* to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is:

(a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner, managing member, or trustee of a party;

(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(c) a person who has more than a de minimis* interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or

(d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.

(3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary,* or the judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, child, or other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household,* has an economic interest* in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding.

(4) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate,* has made a public statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or controversy.

(5) The judge:

(a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated with a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association;

(b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy;

(c) was a material witness concerning the matter; or

(d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court.

(B) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary economic interests, and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of the judge's spouse or domestic partner and minor children residing in the judge's household.

(C) A judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(1), may disclose on the record the basis of the judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge and court personnel, whether to waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and lawyers agree, without participation by the judge or court personnel, that the judge should not be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated into the record of the proceeding.

(D) In limited circumstances, the rule of necessity applies and allows judges to hear a case in which all other judges also would have a disqualifying interest or the case could not otherwise be heard.

Colo. Code. Jud. Cond. 2.11

COMMENT

[1] Under this Rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1) through (5) apply. The term "recusal" is sometimes used interchangeably with the term "disqualification."

[2] A judge's obligation not to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether a motion to disqualify is filed.

[3] The rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification. The rule of necessity is an exception to the principle that every litigant is entitled to be heard by a judge who is not subject to disqualifications which might reasonably cause the judge's impartiality to be questioned. The rule of necessity has been invoked for trial court and court of appeals judges where disqualifications exist as to all members of the court and there is no other judge available. It has been invoked as to the supreme court when all or a majority of its members have a conflict of interest; the importance of having the court render a decision overrides the existence of the conflict, which might otherwise leave litigating parties in limbo. Under the rule of necessity, a judge might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary statute, or might be the only judge available in a matter requiring immediate judicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a temporary restraining order. In matters that require immediate action, the judge must disclose on the record the basis for possible disqualification and make reasonable efforts to transfer the matter to another judge as soon as practicable. Rather than deny a party access to court, judicial disqualification yields to the demands of necessity.

[4] The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the judge is affiliated does not itself disqualify the judge. If, however, the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned under paragraph (A), or the relative is known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be substantially affected by the proceeding under paragraph (A)(2)(c), the judge's disqualification is required.

[5] A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification.

[6] "Economic interest," as set forth in the Terminology section, means ownership of more than a one percent legal or equitable interest in a party, or a legal or equitable interest in a party of a fair market value exceeding $5,000, or a relationship as a director, advisor, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:

(1) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities, or of securities held in a managed fund, is not an "economic interest" in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund;

(2) securities held by an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization in which the judge or the judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child serves as a director, officer, advisor, or other participant is not an "economic interest" in securities held by the organization;

(3) the proprietary interest of a policy holder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositer in a financial institution or deposits or proprietary interests the judge may maintain as a member of a mutual savings association or credit union, or a similar proprietary interest is an "economic interest" in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest; and

(4) ownership of government securities is an "economic interest" in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the securities.

ANNOTATION Law reviews. For article, "Disqualification of Judges", see 13 Colo. Law. 54 (1984). Courts must meticulously avoid any appearance of partiality, not merely to secure the confidence of the litigants immediately involved, but to retain public respect and secure willing and ready obedience to their judgments. Wood Bros. Homes v. City of Fort Collins, 670 P.2d 9 (Colo. App. 1983). Upon reasonable inference of a "bent of mind" that will prevent judge from dealing fairly with party seeking recusal, it is incumbent on trial judge to recuse himself. Wright v. District Court, 731 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1987). At least an appearance of bias or prejudice existed due to a professional relationship between the trial judge and an expert witness for defendants and the trial court erred in denying a motion for recusal. Hammons v. Birket, 759 P.2d 783 (Colo. App. 1988). Not all ex parte communications are per se grounds for disqualification under C.R.C.P. 97. The critical test is whether the affidavits in support of the motion to disqualify, along with any other matters of record, establish facts from which it may reasonably be inferred that the judge is prejudiced or biased, or appears to be prejudiced or biased, in favor of or against a party to the litigation. Goebel v. Benton, 830 P.2d 995 (Colo. 1992). Not every connection between a judge and a participant in a case will require the judge to disqualify himself or herself. It is a judge's duty to sit on a case unless a reasonable person could infer that a judge would be prejudiced against a defendant. People v. Crumb, 203 P.3d 587 (Colo. App., Sept. 18, 2008). Although judges hearing appeal from trial court's dismissal of antitrust action brought against software manufacturer used the operating system at issue in the lawsuit, raising the potential for a conflict of interest, the rule of necessity required those judges to proceed with the case. Pomerantz v. Microsoft Corp., 50 P.3d 929 (Colo. App. 2002). Successor judge erred in determining that the same circumstances that led the trial judge to recuse himself or herself from defendant's other cases also existed before the commencement of trial in this case. People v. Schupper, 124 P.3d 856 (Colo. App. 2005), aff'd, 157 P.3d 516 (Colo. 2007). Appearance of impropriety, not actual prejudice, is sufficient to warrant recusal. Where recusal is sought based upon the relationship of the judge to another person, it is the closeness of the relationship and its bearing on the underlying case that determines whether disqualification is necessary. People ex rel. A.G., 264 P.3d 615 (Colo. App. 2010) (decided under former canon 3(C)), rev'd on other grounds, 262 P.3d 646 (Colo. 2011). Trial court judge erred by determining the relationship between his court clerk and the witness did not warrant judge's recusal. Where court clerk's daughter, as caseworker, was material witness in the case, absent waiver, judge abused his discretion by not recusing from the case. People ex rel. A.G., 264 P.3d 615 (Colo. App. 2010) (decided under former canon 3(C)), rev'd on other grounds, 262 P.3d 646 (Colo. 2011). Applied in People v. Mills, 163 P.3d 1129 (Colo. 2007); Spring Creek Ranchers *advertiser censored*'n, Inc. v. McNichols, 165 P.2d 244 (Colo. 2007); Schupper v. People, 157 P.3d 516 (Colo. 2007); People v. Julien, 47 P.3d 1194 (Colo. 2002); People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448 (Colo. 2000); In re Estate of Elliott, 993 P.2d 474 (Colo. 2000); Office of State Court Adm'r v. Background Info. Services, Inc., 994 P.2d 420 (Colo. 1999); Comiskey v. District Court In and For County of Pueblo, 926 P.2d 539 (Colo. 1996); Wilkerson v. District Court In and For County of El Paso, 925 P.2d 1373 (Colo. 1996); People v. District Court, In and For Eagle County, State of Colo., 898 P.2d 1058 (Colo. 1995); Klinck v. District Court of Eighteenth Judicial District, 876 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1994); Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1993); Goebel v. Benton, 830 P.2d 995 (Colo. 1992); Brewster v. District Court of the Seventh Judicial Dist., 811 P.2d 812 (Colo. 1991); Zoline v. Telluride Lodge *advertiser censored*'n, 732 P.2d 635 (Colo. 1987); People ex rel. A.E.L., 181 P.3d 186 (Colo. App. 2008); Kane v. County Court Jefferson County, 192 P.3d 443 (Colo. App. 2008); Parsons ex rel. Parsons v. Allstate Ins. Co., 165 P.3d 809 (Colo. App. 2006); In re McSoud, 131 P.3d 685 (Colo. App. 2006); Keith v. Kinney, 140 P.3d 141 (Colo. App. 2005); People v. Cambell, 94 P.3d 1186 (Colo. App. 2004); People ex rel S.G., 91 P.3d 443 (Colo. App. 2004); Tripp v. Borchard, 29 P.3d 345 (Colo. App. 2001); Prefer v. PharmNetRx, LLC, 18 P.3d 844 (Colo. App. 2000); People v. Anderson,991 P.2d 319 (Colo. App. 1999); People v. Lanari, 926 P.2d 116 (Colo. App. 1996); People v. Bowring, 902 P.2d (Colo. App. 1995); People v. McCarty, 851 P.2d 181 (Colo. App. 1992); Giralt v. Vail Vill. Inn Assocs., 759 P.2d 801 (Colo. App. 1988). ETHICS OPINIONS A judge who sits on the county bench in a small, rural district and whose spouse wishes to run for election to the city council, which oversees the chief of police, is not required to disqualify himself in cases charged by the police department. He should, however, consider whether the facts and circumstances make disqualification appropriate in a particular case, and, if his spouse is elected, he should disclose her role on the city council in cases charged by the police department. Colo. J.E.A.B. Op. 07-09. A judge is not required to disqualify himself when the judge's estranged godchild's father appears before him, solely because of that relationship, but disqualification may nevertheless be appropriate depending on the judge's subjective and objective analysis of the circumstances. The judge should, however, disclose the godparent relationship to each party when his godchild's father appears in his court. Colo. J.E.A.B. Op. 07-04. A judge need not disqualify herself sua sponte when the attorney who represented the judge's adult daughter appears before the judge. The judge should consult her own conscience to determine whether disqualification is warranted if the judge maintains a disabling prejudice for or against the attorney. If the judge concludes that disqualification is unnecessary, disclosure of the daughter's representation may still be appropriate until the passage of time, the limited consequences of the prior matter and the nature of the judge's relationship with the attorney have made the prior representation irrelevant. Colo. J.E.A.B. Op. 07-01. A judge should disqualify himself or herself sua sponte if an attorney or firm currently representing the judge, or representing the judge's adversary in a current matter, appears before the judge. A judge should also continue to disqualify himself or herself sua sponte for a reasonable period of time after the representation has ended, typically one year, when the judge's attorney, other members of that firm, the judge's adversary's attorneys, or members of that attorney's firm appear before the judge. After the expiration of a reasonable period of time, continued disqualification is not required, but may be appropriate under the facts and circumstances of the case in which the judge was represented. Colo. J.E.A.B. Op. 06-05. A judge who presides over a county court in a small rural jurisdiction should disqualify himself when any member of his brother-in-law's firm appears in the court on which he serves. Colo. J.E.A.B. Op. 05-02. A judge must disqualify in any case in which the judge's spouse, who is an officer employed by a fire protection district which assists the sheriff's department with arson investigations, or those he or she supervises, participated in the investigation of the case. The judge is not, however, required to disqualify from all cases involving a law enforcement agency for which the judge's spouse occasionally performs arson investigations. Colo. J.E.A.B. Op. 05-01. A judge's report of an attorney's misconduct in a case pending before the judge requires the judge to disqualify himself or herself. Colo. J.E.A.B. Op. 04-01.
 
Didn't FOX take her off the case, but no one seemed to know where LS was after she said she'd be at the Memorial? When did she come back? Anybody remember?
So far, Lauren has not shared exactly what happened. There have been many rumors that are all over the place as to why she was pulled/removed herself. She posted periodically, about the Christmas tree for Suzanne, and about the vigils and small pieces about Suzanne still being missing. She stopped publishing investigative work related to Suzanne until the arrest, I think.
 
The video was uncut and unedited.

JMO
Ah, I must have seen an early edited version. But regardless if it lines up with Barry's original story to LE there probably isn't much there to use either by the prosecution or the defense in my opinion. If it's different than what he told LE that would be interesting and perhaps something the prosecution might find interesting. I'm convinced neither side wants to put the YouTube person on the stand however unless prosecution does and it's Barry's defense grilling him on why he was in Salida (and continued to return sporadically) and to throw shade at him for not turning off his camera when asked.
 
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The video TD recorded of him talking to BM.

Did BM owe TD the truth in any of the statements he made to him? I don't see how that video would be valuable in any court proceedings. I see TD as just a guy in passing in this chance encounter. It could have been me. Did BM owe me true statements? I don't think so. IMO
 
Ah, I must have seen an early edited version. But regardless if it lines up with Barry's original story to LE there probably isn't much there to use either by the prosecution or the defense in my opinion. If it's different than what he told LE that would be interesting and perhaps something the prosecution might find interesting. I'm convinced neither side wants to put the YouTube person on the stand however unless prosecution does and it's Barry's defense grilling him on why he was in Salida (and continued to return sporadically) and to throw shade at him for not turning off his camera when asked.
Tyson Draper would not have been under any legal obligation to turn off his camera as Colorado is one party consent.
 
Tyson Draper would not have been under any legal obligation to turn off his camera as Colorado is one party consent.
True, but if by a wild chance the prosecution needed that video then Tyson Draper's credibility comes into play when the defense questions him....legal or not what he did. It probably isn't going to be a positive character trait with some member of the jury that he did what he did so why go there. I personally don't think either side "needs" the video if it's a matter of Barry repeating what he told LE.
 
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