rainbowshummingbird
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dbm
This is for the appeals court, correct? I think it was explained that she's not registered in the 10th Circuit so likely would not be part of the appeal.Iris Eytan withdraws as counsel for Barry Morphew.
So they still have not connected BM to the spot where SM's body was found?
There was some talk last summer about a sitting grand jury hearing the case. I do not think that actually happened or will happen until they can tie BM to the burial site...IMO.
Iris Eytan withdraws as counsel for Barry Morphew.
I believe Iris Eytan/Eytan Law made a motion to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals to withdraw from Barry Morphew’s civil case. I saw it an another platform so I can’t post the image of the appeal.
I am fascinated by defence attorneys who give a hug to a guy they know most likely murdered his wife, and now do know that for sure.
I get defending your client, but ... er ... what the actual?
So no. Not misogyny. Just incredulous reaction to shameless actions.
Remember also, as shared in this thread, Jane B spread conspiracies about the case in the media. That isn't what the constitution calls for in criminal defence, nor civil litigation.
I view it differently. In TV time, good court was a comedy, with catchphrases like “if it doesn’t fit…” In the era of the internet, however, dynamic female lawyers with certain flair use visual tools to deliver the message.
First, take the context. Suzanne had merely “disappeared” then; her body was found much later. The Morphew family life had been complex. So the whole case hinged on Suzanne being absent, and “poor Barry”/s accused of her murder. As it was revealed, Suzanne had a relationship. So during the trial, Barry was supposed to represent “family values”, the father supporting his daughters. Also, the family was Christian. All of it was emphasized.
To start with, Barry is not an orator, but the family is photogenic. So the internet is flooded with pictures. Just the girls and dad vacationing first. (Mom is absent but the dad steps up to his role, the single “doting” father.)
And then the topic moves to that of the courthouse. Here, we mostly see perfect triangles: Barry and daughters on the sides. The girls heads are tilted towards Barry, his angels are supporting him. (Renaissance theme.) Iris the protectoress usually walks behind them. Also, the light and dark-colored themes from old Suzanne’s photos are often replayed here. (I remember Suzanne in light blue, Barry in black, or Suzanne and daughters in black, Barry in light top.) So they alternate the same colors here, but family photos used to be a line. Here, Barry walks slightly ahead, and we see a lot of support on the sides, and Iris got his back. Lots of messages, including: Barry the father, the head of the family, and eventually, the victor.
In the beginning, Iris wears dark. It is a dire situation. (And, business.) It is when the case is dismissed, she emerges in white and hugs him. Nothing personal, nada. It is the form of symbolic “purification” of her client.
Message delivered well.
The only photo where something is off and it honestly, breaks a lot, comes much later. It is during the interview with Barry and the daughters.
So much as it is a horrible case and we all know where Barry belongs, from the standpoint of a good lawyer using the media and the internet to her advantage, Iris did a good job. After all, the word “court” implies a stage, or a huge space, it has to have theatric elements. That hug was part of the high drama.
I honestly think that with a more verbal client, Iris would rely less on the photos. Sometimes I wonder if the hug was meant to shut Barry up, but who can tell now?
Wasn’t that because she isn’t licensed for that particular court? Someone mentioned that in an earlier post here I think.I believe Iris Eytan/Eytan Law made a motion to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals to withdraw from Barry Morphew’s civil case. I saw it an another platform so I can’t post the image of the appeal.
I agree with your theory that this is her strategy. Very nicely put!
I just do not agree that this is part of the job, or even ethical.
Defence attorneys will often work with clients they suspect or know are guilty. In this case, IE has seen everything we have seen and so all courtroom strategies aside, she knows full well the suspicion level is high. So to attach her personal reputation to her clients innocence is a no no in my view, and can damage faith in the institution of the defence attorney.
This is for exactly the reason we have just seen. She staked her personal credibility on his innocence, as if she has inside knowledge or there is corruption etc, only for the body to turn up and reveal the brutal truth.
This is why we learned never to do this. Indeed it is incompatible with the oath that you take.
Unfortunately it seems to have become common place for defence attorneys to claim their client is factually innocent, even where they almost certainly don't know this,
I agree. And, to think of it, it is not the lawyer's job to decide on guilt/innocence. He/she is more of a tennis rebounder, throwing the balls of factual logic to those who make the decision.
Personally, I suspect that only in certain cases one can see the same lawyer constantly proclaiming the clients' innocence. (Perhaps Barry blurted out so much before he retained Iris, that she had to "undo" his own job.)
On a different note. We don't have a thread about the speeches that made history, do we? We should.
You certainly raise an important issue that has been extensively debated in the US. It seems from your comments that the professional standard in your country is stricter than in the US. Here, the best criminal defense attorneys have always been masters of the public relations aspect of defending their clients (Think John Adams, Abe Lincoln, Clarence Darrow, F. Lee Bailey, Johnnie Cochran), some using their rights under the First Amendment to push back on professional restrictions on their public speech.I agree with your theory that this is her strategy. Very nicely put!
I just do not agree that this is part of the job, or even ethical.
Defence attorneys will often work with clients they suspect or know are guilty. In this case, IE has seen everything we have seen and so all courtroom strategies aside, she knows full well the suspicion level is high. So to attach her personal reputation to her clients innocence is a no no in my view, and can damage faith in the institution of the defence attorney.
This is for exactly the reason we have just seen. She staked her personal credibility on his innocence, as if she has inside knowledge or there is corruption etc, only for the body to turn up and reveal the brutal truth.
This is why we learned never to do this. Indeed it is incompatible with the oath that you take.
Unfortunately it seems to have become common place for defence attorneys to claim their client is factually innocent, even where they almost certainly don't know this,
Yes. Her motion indicates that it was because she is not registered to practice before the appellate court. I have not seen a motion to withdraw as an attorney of record in the trial court, but that may be coming for other reasons if and when the lower court regains jurisdiction, if Jane Byrialsen's statement to the Danish press is true.Wasn’t that because she isn’t licensed for that particular court? Someone mentioned that in an earlier post here I think.
Good read. I think it is even a more complex issue in today's world where cases are much more public and media less beholden to be unbiased. Although traditional media does still tend to behave itself around usage of the word "alleged" and "presumed innocent" so more or less stick to facts there is so much information that is readily available to the public who sometimes can't help openly judging guilt or innocence before it is a case and that could be deleterious to seating a fair jury. It can become a catch-22. I understand the over zealousness of a judge to put gag orders in place as soon as possible in high profile cases but that also is it's own Catch-22.You certainly raise an important issue that has been extensively debated in the US. It seems from your comments that the professional standard in your country is stricter than in the US. Here, the best criminal defense attorneys have always been masters of the public relations aspect of defending their clients (Think John Adams, Abe Lincoln, Clarence Darrow, F. Lee Bailey, Johnnie Cochran), some using their rights under the First Amendment to push back on professional restrictions on their public speech.
Here's a brief article that may give us a sense of the dynamic tension between professional obligations and the First Amendment:
"October 01, 2022 ABA Journal - ETHICS
Watch out for these ethical constraints and pitfalls when speaking with the media
By David L. Hudson Jr.
A criminal defense lawyer’s client faces a barrage of negative pretrial publicity. The attorney, wanting to counteract the negativity, speaks to the press and offers a very different version of events than what’s been in the media. The attorney then goes further and makes comments about the conduct of the prosecutor and the judge in the case. Can the lawyer engage the media in this manner, speaking out about a pending case? Or do ethics rules prohibit such conduct?
On one hand, attorney comments outside of the courtroom certainly could have an impact on court proceedings. But attorney speech often contributes to the public’s understanding of the judicial system and serves other values. Furthermore, as constitutional law guru Erwin Chemerinsky wrote, an attorney’s duty to zealously represent clients “often is best served by the attorney speaking to the press.”
Most attorney speech about cases and the judicial system qualifies as political speech, which represents the core values behind the First Amendment. But attorneys are officers of the court, and their speech rights are limited in comparison with those of others.
The starting point is Rule 3.6 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which deals with trial publicity. Subsection (a) provides:
A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.
Subsection (b) of the rule identifies statements that lawyers may make, and subsection (c) offers a safe harbor provision that allows a lawyer to make statements to counteract negative pretrial publicity.
SCOTUS-approved standard
The U.S. Supreme Court approved the standard identified in Rule 3.6(a)—the substantial likelihood standard—in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada (1991). In that case, criminal defense attorney Dominic Gentile held a press conference after his client had been indicted on charges of stealing drugs and traveler’s checks from a safe deposit vault.
At the press conference, Gentile said his client, who owned the business that rented the safe deposit vault, was innocent and that a certain police detective was the likely culprit. Gentile said his client was a “scapegoat.”
Gentile made these statements six months before a scheduled trial date. After the trial, in which his client was acquitted, the State Bar of Nevada charged Gentile with violating a state ethics rule based on ABA Model Rule 3.6. The rule provided:
A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.
However, a provision in the Nevada rule stated, “A lawyer involved in the investigation or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration: the general nature of the claim or defense.”
Gentile argued in his brief that he could not be sanctioned for his speech unless there was a finding of “actual prejudice or a substantial and imminent threat to a fair trial.” In effect, Gentile was advocating for a clear and present danger standard.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the clear and present danger standard for this type of attorney speech and upheld the substantial likelihood standard. The court offered two primary reasons for adopting the lower standard: (1) the identity of the speaker; and (2) the timing of the speech. With respect to the identity of the speaker, the court in Gentile noted that lawyers in pending cases have “special access to information through discovery and client communication.” According to the court, their statements are likely to be viewed as highly authoritative.
The court also reasoned that the timing of the speech noted that restricting attorney speech during the trial will only postpone the attorney’s comments until after the trial. The court also noted that the rule was neutral as to all points of view.
However, a bare majority of the court agreed with Gentile that the Nevada pretrial publicity rule was void for vagueness because Gentile reasonably believed that the safe harbor provision of the rule (allowing statements about the general nature of the defense) protected him in making his statements at the press conference.
The court wrote,”The fact that Gentile was found in violation of the rules after studying them and making a conclusion demonstrates that Rule 177 [the Nevada rule] creates a trap for the wary as well as the unwary.”
Gentile himself supports the general balance set by Rule 3.6. “The rule after my case allows for rebuttal of what has been placed in the public mix by one’s adversary,” he told the ABA Journal in an interview. “Studying it and developing both a strategy and an explanation as to what it rebuts is a must if one seeks its protection.”
He does not believe his speech at the press conference had an impact on the case. “On the other hand, it was immensely important for my client’s emotional stability and self-image,” Gentile said. “It made him able to walk with his head higher than it otherwise would have. He was harmed in the court of public opinion until I spoke out, and then he felt his reputation was improved. His resolve had been diminished and then was restored. Any trial lawyer will tell you how important that is.”
The gag order problem
A related problem arises from both the limited nature of Rule 3.6 and judges’ desire to maintain control over the cases in their courtrooms. The media’s increased interest in—or at least greater coverage of—high-profile cases has led some judges to impose gag orders and other measures designed to prevent carnival-like atmospheres, such as during the Sam Sheppard or O.J. Simpson criminal trial, in which the perception was that the case was being tried in the press rather than the courtroom.
“We have a big gag order problem in certain parts of the country,” says Margaret Tarkington, a law professor at Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law and a leading expert on attorney speech. “There are too many judges who issue overly broad gag orders on attorneys. These are mostly unconstitutional because they prohibit too much speech. They not only violate attorneys’ free-speech rights but also negatively impact the public’s right to access about court proceedings and open courts. Because Rule 3.6 has proven to not be a very workable standard, courts have turned to gag and sealing orders to keep things under wraps. This is concerning, because attorneys can serve as an important check on the judiciary and the court system.”
A need for balance
Tarkington believes Rule 3.6 should be rewritten. It “sets a bizarre standard because it is keyed to prejudice the jury pool or the actual proceeding,” she says. In addition, she notes that many of the most problematic attorney statements concerning cases are made well before the actual court proceedings.
Prosecutors and defense attorneys have very different clients and also very different obligations, Tarkington says. Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules explicitly allows prosecutors to make extrajudicial statements “that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose.” Criminal defense attorneys, on the other hand, often would prefer to avoid any pretrial publicity at all for their clients unless they are “trying to do damage control,” she notes.
“Rule 3.6 is not protective enough of lawyers’ First Amendment rights because attorneys have a First Amendment right to speak about the judiciary and the court system,” says Tarkington, author of Voice of Justice: Reclaiming the First Amendment Rights of Lawyers. “Lawyers have the training and experience to provide to the public a valid critique about the judicial system and the judiciary.”
Even though she has serious critiques of Rule 3.6, Tarkington believes there should be some regulation of lawyers who make outrageous statements in the media that have no basis in law or fact. She also believes “the First Amendment does not prohibit a state from preventing lawyers from lying to the public.” She points to the example of lawyers who consistently made statements about a stolen election and massive voter fraud without providing a basis for such statements. Overall, considering their potential ethics exposure, Tarkington says lawyers should use caution before making unsubstantiated comments to the media.
-------
David L. Hudson Jr. teaches at Belmont University College of Law. He is the author, co-author or co-editor of more than 40 books. For much of his career, he has focused on the First Amendment and professional responsibility.
You certainly raise an important issue that has been extensively debated in the US. It seems from your comments that the professional standard in your country is stricter than in the US. Here, the best criminal defense attorneys have always been masters of the public relations aspect of defending their clients (Think John Adams, Abe Lincoln, Clarence Darrow, F. Lee Bailey, Johnnie Cochran), some using their rights under the First Amendment to push back on professional restrictions on their public speech.
Here's a brief article that may give us a sense of the dynamic tension between professional obligations and the First Amendment:
"October 01, 2022 ABA Journal - ETHICS
Watch out for these ethical constraints and pitfalls when speaking with the media
By David L. Hudson Jr.
A criminal defense lawyer’s client faces a barrage of negative pretrial publicity. The attorney, wanting to counteract the negativity, speaks to the press and offers a very different version of events than what’s been in the media. The attorney then goes further and makes comments about the conduct of the prosecutor and the judge in the case. Can the lawyer engage the media in this manner, speaking out about a pending case? Or do ethics rules prohibit such conduct?
On one hand, attorney comments outside of the courtroom certainly could have an impact on court proceedings. But attorney speech often contributes to the public’s understanding of the judicial system and serves other values. Furthermore, as constitutional law guru Erwin Chemerinsky wrote, an attorney’s duty to zealously represent clients “often is best served by the attorney speaking to the press.”
Most attorney speech about cases and the judicial system qualifies as political speech, which represents the core values behind the First Amendment. But attorneys are officers of the court, and their speech rights are limited in comparison with those of others.
The starting point is Rule 3.6 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which deals with trial publicity. Subsection (a) provides:
A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.
Subsection (b) of the rule identifies statements that lawyers may make, and subsection (c) offers a safe harbor provision that allows a lawyer to make statements to counteract negative pretrial publicity.
SCOTUS-approved standard
The U.S. Supreme Court approved the standard identified in Rule 3.6(a)—the substantial likelihood standard—in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada (1991). In that case, criminal defense attorney Dominic Gentile held a press conference after his client had been indicted on charges of stealing drugs and traveler’s checks from a safe deposit vault.
At the press conference, Gentile said his client, who owned the business that rented the safe deposit vault, was innocent and that a certain police detective was the likely culprit. Gentile said his client was a “scapegoat.”
Gentile made these statements six months before a scheduled trial date. After the trial, in which his client was acquitted, the State Bar of Nevada charged Gentile with violating a state ethics rule based on ABA Model Rule 3.6. The rule provided:
A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.
However, a provision in the Nevada rule stated, “A lawyer involved in the investigation or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration: the general nature of the claim or defense.”
Gentile argued in his brief that he could not be sanctioned for his speech unless there was a finding of “actual prejudice or a substantial and imminent threat to a fair trial.” In effect, Gentile was advocating for a clear and present danger standard.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the clear and present danger standard for this type of attorney speech and upheld the substantial likelihood standard. The court offered two primary reasons for adopting the lower standard: (1) the identity of the speaker; and (2) the timing of the speech. With respect to the identity of the speaker, the court in Gentile noted that lawyers in pending cases have “special access to information through discovery and client communication.” According to the court, their statements are likely to be viewed as highly authoritative.
The court also reasoned that the timing of the speech noted that restricting attorney speech during the trial will only postpone the attorney’s comments until after the trial. The court also noted that the rule was neutral as to all points of view.
However, a bare majority of the court agreed with Gentile that the Nevada pretrial publicity rule was void for vagueness because Gentile reasonably believed that the safe harbor provision of the rule (allowing statements about the general nature of the defense) protected him in making his statements at the press conference.
The court wrote,”The fact that Gentile was found in violation of the rules after studying them and making a conclusion demonstrates that Rule 177 [the Nevada rule] creates a trap for the wary as well as the unwary.”
Gentile himself supports the general balance set by Rule 3.6. “The rule after my case allows for rebuttal of what has been placed in the public mix by one’s adversary,” he told the ABA Journal in an interview. “Studying it and developing both a strategy and an explanation as to what it rebuts is a must if one seeks its protection.”
He does not believe his speech at the press conference had an impact on the case. “On the other hand, it was immensely important for my client’s emotional stability and self-image,” Gentile said. “It made him able to walk with his head higher than it otherwise would have. He was harmed in the court of public opinion until I spoke out, and then he felt his reputation was improved. His resolve had been diminished and then was restored. Any trial lawyer will tell you how important that is.”
The gag order problem
A related problem arises from both the limited nature of Rule 3.6 and judges’ desire to maintain control over the cases in their courtrooms. The media’s increased interest in—or at least greater coverage of—high-profile cases has led some judges to impose gag orders and other measures designed to prevent carnival-like atmospheres, such as during the Sam Sheppard or O.J. Simpson criminal trial, in which the perception was that the case was being tried in the press rather than the courtroom.
“We have a big gag order problem in certain parts of the country,” says Margaret Tarkington, a law professor at Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law and a leading expert on attorney speech. “There are too many judges who issue overly broad gag orders on attorneys. These are mostly unconstitutional because they prohibit too much speech. They not only violate attorneys’ free-speech rights but also negatively impact the public’s right to access about court proceedings and open courts. Because Rule 3.6 has proven to not be a very workable standard, courts have turned to gag and sealing orders to keep things under wraps. This is concerning, because attorneys can serve as an important check on the judiciary and the court system.”
A need for balance
Tarkington believes Rule 3.6 should be rewritten. It “sets a bizarre standard because it is keyed to prejudice the jury pool or the actual proceeding,” she says. In addition, she notes that many of the most problematic attorney statements concerning cases are made well before the actual court proceedings.
Prosecutors and defense attorneys have very different clients and also very different obligations, Tarkington says. Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules explicitly allows prosecutors to make extrajudicial statements “that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose.” Criminal defense attorneys, on the other hand, often would prefer to avoid any pretrial publicity at all for their clients unless they are “trying to do damage control,” she notes.
“Rule 3.6 is not protective enough of lawyers’ First Amendment rights because attorneys have a First Amendment right to speak about the judiciary and the court system,” says Tarkington, author of Voice of Justice: Reclaiming the First Amendment Rights of Lawyers. “Lawyers have the training and experience to provide to the public a valid critique about the judicial system and the judiciary.”
Even though she has serious critiques of Rule 3.6, Tarkington believes there should be some regulation of lawyers who make outrageous statements in the media that have no basis in law or fact. She also believes “the First Amendment does not prohibit a state from preventing lawyers from lying to the public.” She points to the example of lawyers who consistently made statements about a stolen election and massive voter fraud without providing a basis for such statements. Overall, considering their potential ethics exposure, Tarkington says lawyers should use caution before making unsubstantiated comments to the media.
-------
David L. Hudson Jr. teaches at Belmont University College of Law. He is the author, co-author or co-editor of more than 40 books. For much of his career, he has focused on the First Amendment and professional responsibility.
This is very well said, and I can't fault your argument. In an ideal world I would agree entirely. My reservation is that this issue is fraught with difficulty in the real world, arising from both the range of circumstances attorneys and clients face and the difficulty of rule enforcement.This is a good discussion.
From my point of view, with much of this is not difficult to see where the line is drawn. Using this case as our example:
1. The defendant can say anything pre-trial
2, The defence attorney shall avoid saying or doing anything that stakes her own profession reputation on facts at issue.
3. And, (per your discussion) the defence attorney shall not advance conspiracies or allegations not reasonably supported by evidence.
So in terms of discussion, I have no problem with a statement along the lines "my client believes the evidence will establish his factual evidence"
What I am not cool with is "i've just reviewed the initial discovery and I realised my client is factually innocent and he's being set up".
The problem with the later statement, apart from it not being part of the job, is that if the smoking gun evidence then turns up proving guilt, it calls the profession in to disrepute and tends to suggest the defence attorney was lying.
This is why the hug crossed the line IMO. It was theatre to indicate IE's personal belief in the defendant's innocence. But we know of course that she did not really hold a belief he was innocent, and as the civil trial shows, there is prima facie strong suspicion of guilt. The the victim turns up full of BAM ....
In my day, this was policed via ethical standards enforced by the law society. So if I claimed the Crown Prosecutor was corrupt when he in fact brought a case based on a solid prima facie factual basis the Crown would complain about me to the law society and I would obviously be in hot water.
Now obviously IE is not going to be reported to the law society for hugging her client, but i do believe more generally this theme of asserting factual innocence, claiming corruption and spreading conspiracies is deeply damaging.
And on that front, for JB to allege, without evidence, that officers planted evidence at the autopsy - well that is just way out over the line IMO. It appears to nothing more than circular reasoning. i.e my client is innocent so they must have planted it. If BM wants to make such a statement, he should make it in court, or make it personally.
MOO
I have a dumb question….. and this is not directed at you @osu …..Iris Eytan withdraws as counsel for Barry Morphew.
Yes, it's dated 1/15/2025.I have a dumb question….. and this is not directed at you @osu …..
Is that Motion to Withdraw from IIUC the civil case filing by IE dated?
Granted I don’t have access to CO court records or the docket that might contain it. Just a little surprised that the date effective would not be more prominent or apparent. Unless that was by design, perhaps? IANAL. MOO
This is very well said, and I can't fault your argument. In an ideal world I would agree entirely. My reservation is that this issue is fraught with difficulty in the real world, arising from both the range of circumstances attorneys and clients face and the difficulty of rule enforcement.
The ABA Journal article illustrates this through its description of Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada (SCOTUS, 1991). In a press conference before the trial, defense attorney Gentile made precisely the kind of public statement that gives you concerns: he said that his client was innocent and that "...the person that was in the most direct position to have stolen the rugs and the money . . . is Detective Steve Scholl;....there is far more evidence that will establish that Detective Scholl took these drugs and took these American Express Travelers' checks than any other living human being..." He added that the State sought the indictment and conviction of an innocent man as a "scapegoat," and had not "been honest enough to indict the people who did it; the police department, crooked cops." He had studied the state bar's rule about pretrial publicity before making his public statement.
Although the Supreme Court upheld the common bar standard prohibiting attorney speech that will have a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding," it found Nevada's interpretation of that standard to be unenforceably vague.
Attorney Gentile said, “The rule after my case allows for rebuttal of what has been placed in the public mix by one’s adversary. Studying it and developing both a strategy and an explanation as to what it rebuts is a must if one seeks its protection.”
No one has filed a bar complaint against Byrialsen or Eytan for any of their public statements, so they have not had to explain their strategy and explain what it rebuts. But they are respected and even honored in the profession, so I am reluctant to assume they cannot do so. Moreover, they continue to pursue their civil claims quite vigorously. Attorneys cannot file frivolous cases: they are required to offer evidence to support every allegation. If Morphew and his attorneys can offer only speculation based on circular reasoning, they will be open to an abuse of process lawsuit by the defendants. I am not willing to assume that they have no evidence to support their claims.
We have formed a view - supported by evidence that we find compelling - that the discovery and analysis of Suzanne's remains precludes these attorneys from holding in good faith a view that he is innocent. But my opinion to that affect is tentative, and I will firm it up only after I have heard what evidence they have to offer In the civil claims.
Just to complete the picture:Yes, it's dated 1/15/2025.
I've posted the updated docket in the MEDIA ONLY thread and will outline IE's negligence here given how both IE and MSM would be all over this had the 11th Judicial District DA or its Prosecutors been deficient in this manor!
11/12/24 - Admissions Letter sent to IE -- requesting she respond by 12/12/24 pursuant to 10th Circuit Rule 46.2.
12/16/24 - Second Notice, Admissions Letter to Attorney IE response date set to 12/25/24.
1/2/2025 -SecondThird Notice, Admissions Letter to Attorney IE response date set to 1/13/2025.
1/15/2025 - Motion filed by Appellant BM via email for Attorney IE to withdraw as counsel.
1/15/2025 - Order filed by the Clerk of the Court granting Appellant's Attorney Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. BM continues to be represented by Attorneys Fisher, Fisher-Byrialsen, and Whitson.
CO - Suzanne Morphew, 49, Chaffee County, 10 May 2020 , MEDIA,MAPS,TIMELINE *NO DISCUSSION*