Here’s a link to the Court’s full decision:
https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/OpinionFiles/Supreme/2020/SB170081AP.pdf
This ruling relates to the earliest post-Arias bar complaint brought against JM, originally brought in 2016 by an organization of defense attorneys, then joined by others, including the ACLU, via amicus briefs. The Bar recommended JM be reprimanded and put on probation for one year. JM chose to fight, took his case to the Bar’s Disciplinary Committee (headed by Judge O’Neil), and won. The Bar appealed that full dismissal to the Arizona Supreme Court in 2018. It is the Bar's appeal that the Court just ruled upon.
For those who don’t want to wade through the entire ruling (even though that means missing out ), I’ve summarized by plucking out key sections, including their reasoning about why they chose to reprimand JM, and by stripping out all the Court’s citations. Bolded/underlined emphasis is mine.
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FROM THE RULING
“We consider whether prosecutor Juan M. Martinez’s conduct, characterized in five Arizona appellate court decisions as “prosecutorial misconduct” that did not rise to the level requiring reversal of criminal convictions, violates attorney ethical rules.
We affirm the (Bar’s) disciplinary hearing panel’s determination that Martinez did not violate Supreme Court Rule 41(g) and Arizona Rule of Professional Conduct (“ER”) 4.4(a).
We conclude, however, that Martinez violated ER 8.4(d) and we impose the State Bar’s requested sanction of reprimand.”
((ER 8.4(d): “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” ER 8.4(d) “does not require a mental state other than negligence.” (….) An Arizona lawyer may violate the rule without committing any other ethical violation. A lawyer’s conduct violates ER 8.4(d) if it causes injury or potential injury.))
I. Standards used for deciding penalty/sanctions:
(The Court) views the ABA Standards [for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions] as a suitable guideline in determining the proper extent of lawyer discipline. When reviewing the conduct of prosecutors in the context of “prosecutorial misconduct” claims, courts should differentiate between “error,” which may not necessarily imply a concurrent ethical rules violation, and “misconduct,” which may suggest an ethical violation.
II. Applying the ABA Standards
The Bar requests that we impose on Martinez a sanction of reprimand. We agree that, in these circumstances, reprimand is the appropriate sanction.
We determine appropriate disciplinary sanctions in conjunction with the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, (using the ABA’s) four factors:
(a) the duty violated;
(b) the lawyer’s mental state;
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.’”
A. Duty
Martinez’s ethical misconduct involves his comments to juries in Morris, Gallardo, and Lynch II, which we conclude violated ER 8.4(d), because it was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Consequently, (the standards) applicable to cases involving a lawyer’s violation of professional duty which causes injury to a client, the public, or the legal system, inform our analysis.
B. Mental State
Martinez’s mental state when he violated his duties to the public and the legal system determines, in part, the presumptive sanction. The Standards
“recommend more severe sanctions for intentional or knowing misconduct than negligent misconduct, which threatens less harm.”
Martinez’s comments to juries in Morris, Gallardo, and Lynch II, in which he singled out jurors, encouraged them to put themselves in place of the victims to elicit sympathy for the victims and fear of the defendants, or persisted with a line of argument over defense counsel’s sustained objections, were at least negligent (the theory the Bar urges here) in view of Comer’s prohibition on improper appeal to juries and Martinez’s experience as a prosecutor.
C. Potential or Actual Injury
(Specifies standards) each provide that a reprimand is presumptive if a lawyer’s negligent conduct injures or potentially injures the public or the legal system. Martinez argues that his conduct did not constitute ethical misconduct and, therefore, could not cause potential or actual injury. We disagree.
Martinez’s comments to juries in Morris, Gallardo, and Lynch II, and his disregard of defense counsel’s sustained objections in Gallardo, at least potentially caused harm to the public and the legal system. As a prosecutor, Martinez’s serial improper appeals to juries to elicit sympathy for victims and fear of defendants and his failure to comply with a court ruling jeopardized the integrity of the legal system. That Martinez’s negligent conduct did not result in reversal of criminal convictions does not absolve him of ethical culpability for potential systemic injuries.
D. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Martinez’s negligent misconduct injured the public and the legal system. Thus, the presumptive sanction is reprimand. (A reprimand “is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to comply with a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a client or other party, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding”). The sanction to be imposed, however, requires consideration of relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.
The Bar argues that the applicable aggravating factors are: pattern of misconduct; multiple offenses; and substantial experience in the practice of law.
The Bar identifies the applicable mitigating factors as: absence of dishonest or selfish motive, and full and free disclosure to disciplinary board and cooperative attitude toward proceedings.
We agree with the Bar’s identification of applicable aggravating and mitigating factors.
III. Appropriate Sanction
An appropriate sanction advances the primary objectives of lawyer discipline “(1) to protect the public and the courts and (2) to deter the [disciplined] attorney and others from engaging in the same or similar misconduct. “The sanction is not intended to punish the disciplined lawyer.”
The Bar requests a sanction of reprimand. In considering the aggravating and mitigating factors and the purpose of lawyer discipline, we conclude that the presumptive sanction of reprimand is warranted.
Martinez’s repetitious misconduct in addressing jurors in trial in a manner inconsistent with established case law and disregard of sustained objections was prejudicial to the administration of justice and is inexcusable given his substantial experience as a prosecutor and repeated court warnings to cease such conduct.
But we also consider that this is Martinez’s first disciplinary sanction after 36 years as a member of the Bar, including serving 32 years as a prosecutor.
For any lawyer, a reprimand, particularly as a first disciplinary sanction, is a serious consequence and
embodies risk of a more serious sanction if that lawyer again fails to conform to the ethical rules.
This sanction is not intended to punish Martinez, but rather to protect the public and the courts and to deter Martinez and others from engaging in similar misconduct. A reprimand serves these objectives.
We also note the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive and Martinez’s cooperation with the disciplinary panel. Despite this mitigation, we decline to reduce the presumptive sanction of reprimand.
