New Guinea - Amelia Earhart & Fred Noonan, en route to Howland Island, 2 July 1937

AC4RD and Richard......Great information and insight......thank you!
Truly a mystery....I can only hope the disappearance of AE and FN gets resolved.
As a child, my dad and I would watch shows like Unsolved Mysteries and In Search Of. I was fascinated by Bigfoot, UFO'S, and Amelia.
Some questions....Is it "normal" for the pilot to radio in a distress call or would this have been more of a task Noonan should have taken?
Last transmission was of AE saying the word (wait)..then silence. Thoughts? Wait as in I spot something, or maybe she didn't get to finish her sentence?
If they were already lost, how do we know the coordinates she gave were accurate?
 
AC4RD and Richard......Great information and insight......thank you!
Truly a mystery....I can only hope the disappearance of AE and FN gets resolved.
As a child, my dad and I would watch shows like Unsolved Mysteries and In Search Of. I was fascinated by Bigfoot, UFO'S, and Amelia.
Some questions....Is it "normal" for the pilot to radio in a distress call or would this have been more of a task Noonan should have taken?
Last transmission was of AE saying the word (wait)..then silence. Thoughts? Wait as in I spot something, or maybe she didn't get to finish her sentence?
If they were already lost, how do we know the coordinates she gave were accurate?
What is "normal" regarding emergency messages is that the Navigator would have drafted the message with a position/location of the aircraft at a specific time as well as the plane's heading and airspeed. This is vital information needed by anyone doing "flight following" or who would need to initiate Search and Rescue (SAR) efforts. Whoever was normally talking on the radio or sending Morse code messages would send it - if not by the pilot in command, then with his/her concurrence.

Amelia had stated on the outset of her flight that she did not intend to communicate with any radio stations, but would be providing reports of her position at regular times, at 15 and 45 minutes after the hour.

In fact, radio logs indicate that she did NOT transmit position reports on a regular basis at any stage of her trip. On her final leg, except for one position report to Lae, she did not give any other position reports.

She never acknowledged any transmissions from Itasca, never answered any of their questions, and never gave Itasca a position report. She did continue to transmit TO Itasca and did ask them to transmit a homing signal for her to get a Direction finding cut on with her loop antenna. Also, she asked Itasca to try to get a bearing on her transmissions.

Only at one time (at 8:00 AM Howland/Itasca time), Amelia acknowledged receipt of a homing signal (which had been sent on 7500 khz) when she transmitted to Itasca: "... We received your signals but unable to get a minimum please take bearing on us and answer 3105 (khz) with voice."

Itasca could hear Amelia's transmissions, but never established two-way voice communication with her.

Amelia's final airborne voice transmission (on 3105 KCS) was sent at 8:44 AM (Howland/Itasca time). Earhart: "We are on the line of position 157-337, will repeat this message on 6210 KCS. Wait, listening on 6210 KCS. We are running North and South."

Nothing further was heard by Itasca.

It is not certain what she meant by "Wait," but clearly she continued talking immediately after saying it. She may have meant that she would attempt sending her message on 6210 Kilocycles, but that it would take her a moment to switch frequencies.
 
[Some questions....Is it "normal" for the pilot to radio in a distress call or would this have been more of a task Noonan should have taken?]

Richard is our expert on aviation protocols (and I see her replied while I was writing this offline, already), but I'm comfortable saying "SOMEONE should have been doing it." AE was the only person who used the radio by voice on that flight but one station (the radio op at Bulolo) said he worked the Electra early in the flight, working Noonan by Morse code, and said (as others have said) that Noonan was comfortable around 15 words per minute, which is an ordinary rate for a regular non-pro user. It isn't widely known AFAICT that Noonan was documented as using the radio but he DID have a radio station at his navigation table, with a CW (Morse) key, certainly prior to Australia and very likely at the Lae takeoff. (I need to find that documentation and post it--I'll follow up.),

The last reports clearly indicate distress and an emergency situation though Amelia apparently never said "mayday." The ship certainly assumed "emergency situation" when she didn't show up, so an actual "mayday" call verbatim might not have added much. Side note: There are rumors of a woman on the radio screaming for help right before the crash, but I wouldn't call those credible from what I've heard.

[Last transmission was of AE saying the word (wait)..then silence. Thoughts? Wait as in I spot something, or maybe she didn't get to finish her sentence?]

Definitely a "who knows" thing IMO. :)

[If they were already lost, how do we know the coordinates she gave were accurate?]

That is a KEY point, and IMO we don't. She never really did give coordinates, exactly; the closest I recall was "we must be on you" (meaning very close to Howland.) That was based, I suppose, on the dead reckoning estimate they had aboard the plane, and it clearly wasn't dead-on-correct, was it? My own opinion is that the best evidence we have of her actual position was the signal strength peak a half hour before the splash. That was well-documented at the time by professional radio operators, unlike so much of what we are offered as "evidence" in the AE matter. (Woman's shoe sole found on Nikumaroro? AE didn't wear woman's shoes while flying, see the photo evidence. Freckle cream bottle? Did AE ever USE freckle cream, and would she have brought it along on that flight even if she DID?) :-/ I mean, Noonan even saved weight by leaving behind (in his hotel at Lae) some of his "smoke bombs"--he'd drop them during daylight to measure the winds aloft. We know they had 26kt head/crosswinds for hours early in flight (Richard, that was a very nice illustration of the issue you posted!) when they were expecting less, AE flew higher than planned, after takeoff, due to mountains--there were just a million challenges to traditional celestial and DR navigation.

The thing is, if AE had bothered to learn how to use the RDF loop aboard the plane--and it's documented that she brushed off the teaching session she had with Joe Gurr and then failed in her one known test-use in flight--they'd have been fine. *IMO* but I'd call it beyond doubt, really. Noonan should have been able to deal with that if he had realized AE's problem--and I can't imagine why he didn't figure that out and why he didn't do something. As a navigator, Noonan should have known IMO to send long dashes on 500kHz so Itasca could home on the plane and report by voice on 3105. (Side note: over-water international air flights still use shortwave, including frequencies close to AE's, to give in-flight position and status reports; satcom hasn't replaced that yet. I hear them routinely on 3494, 5550, 6557, 8846, etc.)

Sorry, I tend to ramble. :)

I do think turning back before the halfway point on fuel is CERTAINLY something AE/FN would have had in mind and would have considered before the flight. If they did turn back, west, not south, as Richard said, is unquestionably the choice they'd have made, but I don't think they did. They never broadcast that they did, AE's "we must be on you" to _Itasca_ says she didn't, beyond question, so I feel comfortable in saying they did NOT turn back at the "point of no return" in the flight.

IMO they did the "splash and sink" scenario somewhere 30 minutes of time from their closest approach to Howland. Were they then flying for endurance or for range? (I read about the difference somewhere online.) Wasn't 90kts the Electra's best fuel speed? They went in, I'd guess, within 100mi of Howland. Which is a HUGE amount of ocean.

Very very sad all aroundh. I think the loss is clearly due to AE's obvious inattention to planning and preparation--she discarded all her radio log notes, frequencies and schedules, etc., before leaving Lae, in addition to never using her RDF successfully before that last flight, and never establishing realtime HF communications with _Itasca_ on the flight. All just MHO, of course. Thanks for contributiing to thread! --ken ac4rd

(oh, and side issue for Richard: the Lockheed people actually modeled the weight of the Electra in water, after the disappearance, and the CG would have been very far forward with empty tanks and those huge engines; they said the cockpit would be underwater and the tail out of the water. I can find that reference if you want.)

Ah, and I see Richard has already replied, "good show, old bean." In reply to your "Itasca could hear Amelia's transmissions, but never established two-way voice communication with her," they DARNED sure tried, repeatedly. Elgen Long says the "different time zones" issue may have meant Itasca was calling at the same time AE was listening--her bizarre habit of not working two-way back-and-forth with ground stations but transmitting blindly and then listening 15/30 minutes later. Radiomen were baffled by that, and it was a stupid choice by AE and caused poor comms a number of times. We know AE heard _Itasca_ on 7500kHz with the homing signal (Morse); she understood that well enough. She didn't know her RDF loop wasn't calibrated to go over 1500kHz or whatever it was--it would have been USELESS for homing at that frequency (though she could hear it, the loop could not 'get a minimum' at frequencies that high.)


Poor planning, inadequate preparation. Very sad.
 

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AE was the only person who used the radio by voice on that flight but one station (the radio op at Bulolo) said he worked the Electra early in the flight, working Noonan by Morse code, and said (as others have said) that Noonan was comfortable around 15 words per minute, which is an ordinary rate for a regular non-pro user. It isn't widely known AFAICT that Noonan was documented as using the radio but he DID have a radio station at his navigation table, with a CW (Morse) key, certainly prior to Australia and very likely at the Lae takeoff. (I need to find that documentation and post it--I'll follow up.),
I found the reference about Alan Vagg, the Bulolo radio operator, who said he worked the Electra by Morse early in the flight--he was trading shifts on and off with the Lae operator at the time. Screenshots attached.

Two points of note: This particular book (the title page is in the screenshots) is the only source I know of that says the Electra used Morse on the Howland flight. I think it's entirely plausible: Noonan had to pass a higher-level Morse test to get his licensure in the first place, and as a ship navigator he'd have needed to use Morse on a somewhat regular basis in those days--Pan Am, for instance, had NO voice communications with planes in those days, it was all Morse code. Some PAA coworkers said Noonan had routine 15-16wpm ability, which is "good normal" for someone who uses it fairly regularly. And we do know Noonan had a radio station at his navigation table in the rear--it appears that's where the Electra's actual transmitter was located. (The receiver was under AE's seat in the cockpit.)

So first point is that Noonan certainly SHOULD have been able to use Morse fairly routinely, and this one book says he did on *the actual flight from Lae*, early in the flight. But this one book is the only source I've seen for Vagg's claim that he did work the Electra in flight. (To "work" a station means establishing two-way communications; we still call it that in the shortwave world.) So it seems believeable to me, but I haven't seen that confirmed anywhere. I'd think if it's true it's important--but I'd also think more people would have commented on it in their own AE books.

Second point was: if it's true that Noonan could contact and communicate via Morse from the back of the plane, why didn't he DO that when Amelia was flailing with her microphone? That could have gotten them a bearing from _Itasca_'s rangefinder, and Noonan would have known that. That's a real puzzler IMO. It casts doubt on the validity of the Vagg/Morse thing, again IMO.

This book by Horner is full of interesting details, though I found its overall argument hard to believe. Recommended as background reading for those interested. Happy Fourth, y'all! --ken
 

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I knew that AE was not well trained in the use of her direction finding (df) equipment. But had not really heard anything about Itasca's capabilities. Did they have any? Were any bearings on her signal reported? I don't recall reading about that anywhere.
 
I knew that AE was not well trained in the use of her direction finding (df) equipment. But had not really heard anything about Itasca's capabilities. Did they have any? Were any bearings on her signal reported? I don't recall reading about that anywhere.
Ah. There's a HUGE big problem. Amelia appears to have believed that her RDF on board the Electra could take bearings in flight up to 7500kHz. In real life, the upper limit for her system was more like 1500kHz. Which was about an absolute limit for loop-based systems in those days. And AE didn't even know how to work the Bendix RDF loop up to its actual limit--she brushed off the tutorial Joe Gurr tried to give her on it, and then when she "tested" the system in flight, she was unable to work it.

Now a CAREFUL pilot would have stopped and asked what the problem was, why the RDF wasn't doing what she thought it would do. But she shrugged it off: "We must be too close." (This is all documented in Elgen Long's book.)

Itasca was able to do direction-finding in the longwave band (270 to 550kHz, see the screenshot; kindle online showing the Long book.) Amelia never TRIED to send a homing signal in that range. I can only guess that Noonan never came up to the cockpit until it was far too late to figure out why AE was floundering with the radio and with the RDF. Harry Manning (again, this is all in Long's book) gave AE radio details for the first flight; when they changed and Manning had left the team, nobody bothered to update the ground stations. And _Itasca_ got outdated incorrect details about AE's radio setup. AE was informed about Swan, Ontario, and Itasca's radio abilities and she noted SOME of it (she only asked _Itasca_ to send voice on 3105, says Long, so she apparently knew that's the only frequency of hers Itasca COULD transmit voice on) but was disastrously wrong about their RDF abilities--and she left her radio log/plan book at Lae to save weight, so she didn't even have it on board. (That's not the Long book, I'll find the cite for that if anybody wants.)

Apart from the ship, the Army or Interior department sent a special experimental RDF setup, manned by someone named Cipriani, and had it set up on Howland. In theory, it could take accurate bearings up to Amelia's frequencies. Yau Fat Lum, one of the radiomen who lived on Howland at the time, said it was a piece of junk. We'll never know how good it was because Cipriani turned it on at 10pm and the batteries were dead at sunrise when it was needed. (There's a lot of conspiracy-theory-grade talk about Cipriani and where he was, when, but none of it seems significant to me.)

So Amelia tried to send homing signals, for the _Itasca_ to take bearings on, on 3105kHz, by saying "DAAAAaaah!" into the microphone instead of using a Morse key for a STEADY-level signal. The _Itasca_ couldn't DF on 3105, even if AE had sent a Morse homing signal as she should have. Cipriani on shore in theory could have, maybe, but that was another massive SNAFU. And AE tried to take RDF bearings several times, with no better results than if a child had been fiddling the knobs.

I've read that Pan-Am Airlines, which was pioneereing Clipper service by flying boat through the Pacific in those days, offered to let her use their very good Adcock RDF system, which they developed for exactly the sort of flying that AE was doing. AE turned them down, possibly thinking she didn't need another system to learn. Or daunted by the Morse-only requirement. (see the 1953 clipping screenshot, ham radio magazine shows 5yo girl who passed her 5wpm Morse test. How hard can it BE? We run 50wpm in contests.)

Once again I'm getting too talkative about it. But IMO the total inability to understand the basic RDF setup on EITHER end, hers or the ship's setup, was inexplicable, stupid, disastrous, and ENTIRELY preventable. :-( --ken
 

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Boy Scouts of America was founded in 1910. Scouts were trained in Morse Code from 1911 on, and in the early years, had to have some level of proficiency at it to make First Class Scout. Later Morse Code was part of the Signaling merit badge. That merit badge went obsolete and was discontinued some time in the 1970's, but it was one of four "Historic" merit badges brought back for one year in 2010 to commemorate the Centennial of Scouting.
 
I should have mentioned that the Boy Scouts still recognize and encourage use of Morse Code through their "Interpreter Patch" program, along with various foreign languages.

 
I was an Eagle Scout and involved in Boy Scouts for 35 years. I don't recall doing anything with morse. I just looked up what was required for the Signs Signals and Codes merit badge and its sort of a joke. Pretty much just being aware of it. That is really too bad. It is a skill that we shouldn't let die out and Scouting would be a good place to help keep it alive.
 
Civilian aircraft making a mayday call in United States airspace are encouraged by the FAA to use the following format, omitting any portions as necessary for expediency or where they are irrelevant (capitalization as in the original source):

"Mayday, Mayday, Mayday; (station being addressed), This is (call sign), type of aircraft ----, Position ---- at time ----, Heading ----, Airspeed ----, Altitude ----, Fuel remaining (in time), Nature of Emergency ----, Number of persons on board, weather, other useful information."
 
AE tried to take RDF bearings several times, with no better results than if a child had been fiddling the knobs.

Do we have any evidence of her knowing how to use radios in general? I’ve been frequently struck by her ‘refusals’ detailed here.. To learn a new system, to learn Morse, to establish 2-way comms, etc.

It all strikes me as someone who doesn’t understand the underlying principles of radio, and rather than acknowledge that, imperiously dismisses various suggestions, advice, trainings, and the like. Twiddling knobs, indeed.

(As a new ham, I feel like I recognize some of these behaviors as not wanting to appear ignorant, but perhaps I’m reading too much into things.)
 
@Richard. I am so sorry to interrupt your conversation. Truly rude of me.
But you know about planes, obviously....and I think you might have popped up on the Michael Burnham escapee, page.
There is a new post by regarding a particular plane leaving Altoona pa for the area of the escapee....and if you knew anything about this. I can't find anything about the plane on any news yet...so just wondered if you know any tracking sites.
Again sorry for the intrusion! Regards, NHmm.
 
Do we have any evidence of her knowing how to use radios in general? I’ve been frequently struck by her ‘refusals’ detailed here.. To learn a new system, to learn Morse, to establish 2-way comms, etc.

It all strikes me as someone who doesn’t understand the underlying principles of radio, and rather than acknowledge that, imperiously dismisses various suggestions, advice, trainings, and the like. Twiddling knobs, indeed.

(As a new ham, I feel like I recognize some of these behaviors as not wanting to appear ignorant, but perhaps I’m reading too much into things.)
Cenazoic, there's lots of discussion about this ... let me digress for a moment to A.) thank Richard for the nice cutaway Electra illustration and 2.) tell Richard that the info that Alan Vagg, the radio operator at Bulolo, worked the Electra via Morse code on its flight from Lae is also found in Paul Rafford's book _AE's Radio_. Confirmed. Which is interesting but raises again the issue of why Noonan wasn't busy on the radio as they neared Howland, now that we know he COULD use the radio station in the back, in flight.

Cenazoic, a number of authors have said Earhart's radio technique was bizarre and baffling; you know about "skeds" being an old radio ham (ES 73 de AC4RD!); well, Amelia didn't. Or she refused to use skeds and regular two-way communications. Elgen Long's book on AE's last flight is the best overall treatment of AE and radio I know of, though parts of it are outdated now; Long says (as do many other authors) that AE's radio practices frustrated ground stations and angered the operators; she got chewed-out on arrival in Darwin for not radioing the tower when she wanted to land. She had an excuse but like almost all aero ground stations in those days, it was Morse-only, apparently.

AE didn't do two-way communications and she would not try Morse, and the "why" is not something I can guess at: maybe she thought because she was famous she didn't need to follow the rules, maybe she was afraid of doing badly, maybe she never understood how vital it was, whatever. Long's book (your library may have it, it was a bestseller in the field) documents how she simply declined to learn how to use her new RDF loop and control box--i suppose she thought she would figure it out "on the fly," not understanding what a horrible decision that was. Long explains the control box ... here, I'm going to attach a screenshot of that part. IMO a good pilot would have wanted to find out why she couldn't use the RDF on the test flight, and resolved the problem.

So AE thought she could take bearings, but she was profoundly wrong on that. There are other important points in AE's radio failures: to save weight she didn't keep her radio book with information (frequency capabilities etc) of ground and ship stations she'd be using, she thought she could take bearings on 7500kHz (upper limit was 1400kHz iirc), didn't know how much she crippled her setup by omitting the trailing antenna (Itasca could have taken bearings on her 150mi out on 500kHz), it appears she may not have remembered to switch from the RDF loop to the V-antenna to receive the earth stations (may not have known she needed to?), refused just to talk back and forth the way the radiomen expected ... Noonan couldn't guarantee hitting HOwland without RDF (E Long explains why) but AE spent almost no time on it and ignored the failure when she didn't make it work on a test flight. These errors were IMO foolish, inexplicable, and fatal.

If AE had put her shaky 5 words-per-minute (she had to pass that test to get her license), she'd have found her speed and confidence growing quickly. (I passed 5wpm in '91, then worked CW DX on 15 meters for 6 months. I passed 20wpm without any formal practicing, just having fun on the air.) Even with her own inept RDF skills, if Amelia had put long dashes in CW on 500kHz, Itasca could have done the rdf work and told her on 3105 voice what her bearing was. AE had multiple chances to make the flight succeed IMO but she blundered badly, repeatedly. :-(

ping me some time off the main thread and tell me if you're having fun with radio! 73! --ken
 

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@Richard. I am so sorry to interrupt your conversation. Truly rude of me.
But you know about planes, obviously....and I think you might have popped up on the Michael Burnham escapee, page.
There is a new post by regarding a particular plane leaving Altoona pa for the area of the escapee....and if you knew anything about this. I can't find anything about the plane on any news yet...so just wondered if you know any tracking sites.
Again sorry for the intrusion! Regards, NHmm.
Sorry, but I do not have any specifics on this particular case. Any pilot flying on a cross country, point to point trip would have had to file their flight plan at the point of take off. If this plane left Altoona, then that is where I would check on it.
 
Air to ground radio communications started in 1910, some 27 years before Amelia's final flight. Here is a story about the Lighter-than-Air craft "America" attempting to cross the Atlantic Ocean and sending the first Air to Ground message:

 
R.177432dfa9773ca77953aaded67e6f63

Amelia Earhart's Lockheed Electra 10E (NR 16020) suffered major damage in Hawaii following a ground loop on take off in her first Round-the-World flight attempt. It was repaired and modified in Burbank, California and made ready for a second attempt in 1937.

Image result for Amelia Earhart leans Over the Fuel Tanks. Size: 174 x 185. Source: earharttruth.wordpress.com
Photographed from the rear of the plane, Amelia Earhart leans over the extra fuel tanks that have been installed in the aft cabin of her Electra. (AP)

This Electra was equipped with a Western Electric Model 13C radio transmitter and Model 20B receiver for radio communication.

LINK:

 

This is Mrs. Nina Lear (or llyr) Margaret Paxton (1896-1970) who claimed to have heard radio transmissions sent by Amelia Earhart on 3 July 1937, the day after Amelia and Fred were no longer airborne.

LINKS:



 
Interesting that in her first letter in the archive, she basically says she knew it was Amelia, but everything seemed fine and she turned the radio down ; she even apologizes for not listening attentively! By the 1962 article, she reports all kinds of details from that signal, and hearing Noonan later on, besides.
 

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