I am not the deceptive kind in this commentary .. I read many things as well.
Here is more info to peruse :
http://www.leagle.com/decision/19931365853SW2d512_11323.xml/VALENZUELA v. AQUINO
Because of the vital privacy interests at stake, I would hold that the trial court's injunction is a valid restriction of the Petitioners' right to engage in expressive conduct. Individuals are not required to become captives in their own homes, with no "recourse of escape" from intrusive, unwanted speech. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 479, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2299, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. at 487, 108 S.Ct. at 2504; Klebanoff, 552 A.2d at 679. Unlike the half-mile prohibition previously set aside, 763 S.W.2d at 45, the present 400-foot prohibition, measured from the center of the residential lot, is not so broad as to preclude all picketing or other activities in the surrounding neighborhood. Nor does this prohibition foreclose the Petitioners' right to express their views through alternate channels. The injunction does, however, preclude picketing focused on the Aquino household. Because such picketing interferes with the Aquinos' right of privacy, it is not protected under either the Texas or the United States Constitutions. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. at 486-87, 108 S.Ct. at 2503-04; Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539, 544-45 (10th Cir.1974); Degregory v. Giesing, 427 F.Supp. 910, 915 (D.Conn.1977); Hall v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 72 F.Supp. 533, 537 (D.Haw.1947); Dayton Women's Health Center v. Enix, 68 Ohio App.3d 579, 589 N.E.2d 121, 127 (1991); Town of Barrington v. Blake, 568 A.2d 1015, 1020-21 (R.I.1990); Klebanoff, 552 A.2d at 679; Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis.2d 398, 182 N.W.2d 530, 536-37 (1971).
But Texas law has also extended broad protection to the right of privacy. In the seminal Texas case, this court noted that the right of privacy has been defined as "the right of an individual to be left alone, to live a life of seclusion." Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex.1973) (upholding homeowner's recovery based on illegal wiretap at his residence). So important is this right in Texas that, independent of the federal constitution, the Texas Constitution protects personal privacy from unreasonable intrusion. Texas State Employees Union v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex.1987).
One important function of the right of privacy has been to preserve the sanctity of the home. This court has long viewed the household as a sanctuary"a place of residence for the family, where the independence and security of a home may be enjoyed," free from "harassment and disturbance." Iken v. Olenick, 42 Tex. 195, 198 (1875); see also Porter v. Southwestern Public Service Co., 489 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (zoning ordinances may be used to protect residential area from free exercise of property rights). This view has been central to our privacy jurisprudence; for example, in describing the Texas Constitution's protection of privacy, this court noted that two provisions in our bill of rights "guarantee the sanctity of the individual's home and person against unreasonable intrusion." Texas State Employees Union, 746 S.W.2d at 205 (discussing Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 9, 25). Accordingly, Texas courts have viewed harassment in one's residence as an intrusion upon seclusion in violation of the right of privacy. See Donnel v. Lara, 703 S.W.2d 257 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).