Here’s an example of how that argument might go. Keep in mind that this CT “no body” case was way back in 1994 before DNA PCR technology was in common use, as it is now, so they could only argue on blood presence and blood type, rather than exact DNA match as we have in this case. Nonetheless the jury still returned a guilty verdict. (This is from the defendant’s appeal).
And, on the notion of sex trafficking, this case below involved an on-call masseuse (rather than a stay home mom of 5) and selling into sex trafficking was never considered or introduced. So I would guess that FD has an even lesser likelihood of prevailing with that line of argument, although I wouldn’t put it past FD to be involved in that kind of slimy endeavor. I can just see NP twirling his ponytail when he came up with that one, “hey Fotis, how about we say
you sold her as a sex slave, to alleviate her stress over the divorce and losing custody! We just need one juror to believe that!”
With that, read on how this case (Carla Almeida, disappeared 1988) was argued:
“With this background in mind, we begin our analysis by acknowledging the absence in this case of certain types of evidence that we have identified in other cases as supporting an inference of an intent to kill. Thus, there was in this case no body or evidence of body parts; compare
State v.
Crafts, supra,
226 Conn. 237;
State v.
Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 529 N.E.2d 1236 (1988);
State v.
James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991); no evidence of the specific type of weapon used; compare
State v.
Raguseo, supra, 225 Conn. 120; no evidence of the specific type of wound inflicted on the victim; compare id.;
State v.
Chace, 199 Conn. 102, 106, 505 A.2d 712 (1986); and no evidence of prior planning, preparation or motive. Compare
State v.
Crafts,supra, 251;
State v.
Pinnock, 220 Conn. 765, 790, 601 A.2d 521 (1992);
State v.
Grant, 219 Conn. 596, 604, 594 A.2d 459 (1991). We conclude, nonetheless, that the circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawable therefrom are sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant had the intent to kill the victim.
First, according to Lee's testimony, the bloodstain in the carpet in the family room was large, measuring approximately eleven inches by fifteen inches. The stain, on the surface and underside of the carpet and on the underlying padding, was a vivid red, indicating a strong and fresh concentration of blood, as opposed to other liquid that may have entered the saturated area
[231 Conn. 128]
from the later shampooing of the rug.
7 Lee testified that the bloodstain exhibited a direct contact and transfer pattern, and that the blood had soaked through "quite a few layers" of fabric, indicating that the source of the blood was on top of the carpet. By Lee's "very conservative" estimate, the amount of blood that had caused the stain was 1000 cubic centimeters. Lee equated that amount of blood to one liter, or a "little bit over" one quart. He testified that this represented approximately one-fourth of the total blood in the body of a woman of average build.
Second, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that the fatal wound of the victim was caused by a weapon, rather than by human hands. This inference was permissibly based on the amount of blood found at the scene, and Lee's testimony to the effect that the amount of blood was caused by some instrument that was capable of cutting into a blood vessel or cutting deeply into the body.
Third, as noted above, Lee testified to the effect that, in order for the weapon to have caused a wound yielding that much blood, the weapon would have been required to "cut"
8 very deeply into the body or to have cut a blood vessel, namely, a vein or artery. Thus, the
[231 Conn. 129]
jury could have inferred that the weapon that the defendant used in killing the victim had an edge or point sharp enough and had been used vigorously enough to cut or penetrate deeply enough into the body so as to cause the massive bleeding that Lee estimated.
Fourth, the evidence supports the inference that the defendant caused that wound by using a weapon in the family room. The jury, using its common experience, could have inferred that a family room, unlike perhaps a garage or basement, is not the kind of room in a house that would ordinarily contain a weapon capable of causing that kind of wound. From this, the jury could also infer that, before using the weapon, the defendant either had such a weapon in his possession while he was in that room or had obtained it from some other part of the house.
9
Fifth, there was evidence of the defendant's failure to summon medical assistance for the victim. In both
State v.
Greenfield, supra, 228 Conn. 78, and
State v.
Francis, 228 Conn. 118,128-29, 635 A.2d 762 (1993), we noted the defendant's failure to summon medical assistance for his victim as part of the evidence from which the jury could have inferred an intent to kill. The reasoning underlying those cases is that it can be inferred that, if the defendant has caused a grievous wound that could cause the victim's death if not treated promptly, the failure to summon that treatment is consistent with an antecedent intent to cause death.
[231 Conn. 130]
Sixth, there was very strong evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt. This evidence consisted of the defendant's: (1) hiding the victim's body and disposing of the victim's car within a very short period of time; (2) attempting to destroy the bloody evidence, in both his house and his car; (3) sudden flight to Turkey; and (4) use of aliases upon his return to the United States. We have in the past considered consciousness of guilt evidence as part of the evidence from which a jury may draw an inference of an intent to kill. See
State v.
Patterson,229 Conn. 328, 333, 641 A.2d 123 (1994);
State v.
Francis, supra, 228 Conn. 131;
State v.
Reid,193 Conn. 646, 656, 480 A.2d 463 (1984).
In sum, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to have inferred that: (1) the defendant killed the victim; (2) he used a weapon with a sharp edge or point with sufficient force to cut a blood vessel, or to cut or penetrate her body deeply enough, so as to cause her to lose one fourth of the blood in her body; (3) prior to using the weapon, the defendant either had the weapon in his possession or had left the family room to obtain it; (4) the victim lay on the rug, bleeding massively from the wound; (5) after inflicting the wound, the defendant did not summon medical assistance for his victim; (6) shortly after killing the victim, the defendant took extraordinary measures to destroy the evidence, and extraordinarily successful measures to hide the body; and (7) he took extraordinary measures to avoid apprehension. Although the evidence certainly did not mandate an inference of an intent to kill, we conclude that, taken together, it reasonably supports the inference of an intent to kill that the jury drew.”
STATE v. SIVRI | 231 Conn. 115 (1994) | conn1151342 | Leagle.com
